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Reforming the State in Brazil 
I: Introduction 
Maria D'Alva Gil Kinzo 
Throughout its political history Brazil has never been in a situation so singular 
as the one experienced in this last decade of the century. The transformations in 
the economic and political structures that the country has undergone since the 
early 1990s can only be compared, in importance and depth, to those that 
occurred in the 1930s. 
The three pillars that gave sustainability to the post-1930 social and 
economic transformations are well known. First, the prominent role of the state 
in the promotion of economic development, with its direct participation as an 
economic actor in various sectors of the economy ; second, the concentration of 
power and centralisation of decision-making in the hands of a strong leadership, 
leaving limited space for parliamentary politics (when not suppressing it 
completely); and third, the corporatist structure of labour relations in which the 
state controlled and arbitrated social conflict. These are the pillars that marked 
the pattern of state-society relations that lasted for more than five decades in 
Brazil. 
In the 1990s, in contrast, the nature of the changes in progress consists 
precisely in reformulating that model of development - or creating a new one -
which implies a redefinition of the role the state played in the past. This involves 
the replacement of the three pillars mentioned above, as they can no longer be 
the basis for development in the new context. The state-led import-substituting 
industrialisation model was no longer appropriate for development when 
economic stagnation, high inflation and worldwide economic transformations 
made the need for overall restructuring of Brazil's economy imperative. The 
Brazilian corporatist structures are no longer operative in a context of more 
autonomous and powerful union movements and other channels of interest 
intermediation. The concentration and centralisation of policy-making that 
characterised the period of Vargas's rule cannot be the way public decisions 
should be made in Brazil's democratic regime of today. 
However, it is precisely this last aspect - the democratic context under which 
transformations have been carried out - that gives singularity to the current 
situation in Brazil, making the present a complex process of change the results 
of which are still uncertain. In other words, it is a process of change taking place 
in a political system that, due to its democratic nature, gives room for the free 
manifestation and interplay of a variety of social and political forces, 
vying to influence decision-making; moreover, it is a political context in which 
the new and the old are still overlapping. Thus, old political habits crystallised 
by an authoritarian and statist past still coexist with new democratic practices 
invigorated by the emergence of democracy. 
The three papers that form this publication are important contributions to the 
understanding of the complexities of Brazil's current process of change. They 
are concerned with interest intermediation in the ongoing process of state reform 
that Brazil has undergone since the early 1990s. For that purpose three relevant 
actors - big business, unions and regional interests - are studied with the aim of 
assessing their capacity to influence decision-making and therefore their role in 
the present process of change. 
Ben Schneider's paper looks at an important aspect of the interest 
intermediation issue - the role played by industrialists in the present process of 
constitutional reform in Brazil. His work reveals that, contrary to what might be 
expected, industrialists have not been successful in their attempt to influence the 
process of reform, at least in their capacity as a collective actor to lobby for their 
interests in Congress. The industrialists' low capacity to aggregate their 
interests, their disarticulation as a collective actor, the effect of the corporatist 
system and the existing pattern of electoral politics in Brazil are aspects 
discussed by Schneider in his analysis of the issue. 
Maria Herminia Tavares de Almeida's paper on the unions is an analysis of 
the challenges that unions are facing as a result of the changing environment in 
which they operate today. Thus, in spite of the increasing role that unions 
achieved as a result of democratisation, their capacity to influence the process of 
change has been eroded not only by worldwide economic transformations, but 
also by institutional constraints in Brazil's political system. 
Finally, Celina Souza explores another important factor that made state 
reform a complex process in Brazil - the interplay of regional interests in the 
country, the role of which has substantially increased with the decentralisation 
established by the 1988 Constitution. Displaying the cleavages and tensions that 
have characterised the relationship between national and sub-national 
governments, Souza points out the federal government's financial constraints 
and difficulties in building up coalitions to support its reform policies. 
This Research Paper originates from a conference entitled Power Structure, 
Interest Intermediation and Policy-Making: Prospects for Reforming the State 
in Brazil, held by the Institute of Latin American Studies on 13 and 14 February 
1997. Several aspects of the structure and dynamics of decision-making and the 
prospects for reform in Brazil were discussed during that two-day meeting. The 
papers included in this publication are a good indication of the richness of the 
debate during the conference. 
II: Business Politics in Democratic Brazil* 
Ben Schneider 
In May 1996, the National Confederation of Industry (CNI) convened a meeting 
of industrialists in Brasilia for a mass show of unity and focused lobbying in 
favour of constitutional reform. Industrialists, large and small, heeded the call. 
Nearly three thousand of them from all over Brazil chartered planes and packed 
shuttles. Fortified by a morning of speeches demanding constitutional reforms, 
the industrialists fanned out over Brasilia in the afternoon to argue their case. As 
if to demonstrate they could not be intimidated, Congress chose that very 
afternoon to vote down a reform proposal backed by business. By the end of 
1996, it was clear that business had made little progress over the year in pushing 
the several amendments business supported through Congress. 
By December the press was also investigating a story that earlier that year 
Deputy Pedrinho Abrao, a leader of the Brazilian Labour Party (PTB) and a 
political heavyweight on the Budget Committee, had demanded a four per cent 
tip (around $1.6 million) on a $42 million budget item from the construction 
firm Andrade Gutierrez. In exchange, Abrao promised to keep funds in the 1997 
budget for the continuation of a dam in the north-east (see Folha de Sao Paulo, 
12 December 1996, pp. 1-1,1-4,1-5). These two events illuminate the continuing 
dilemmas and ironies of business politics in Brazil. Business has poured money 
into politics on all fronts. What has it got in return? To the extent the Abrao case 
is indicative of broader practices, personalised exchange can still yield 
individual benefits. Yet on the public stage, business has had little collective 
influence. The major goals of this paper are to analyse this collective weakness 
and, more briefly, consider some major causes and consequences of it. 
The transition to democracy in Brazil forced big industrialists in Brazil to 
rethink their political activities and reorganise themselves for articulating 
focused political influence (see Payne, 1994 and Weyland, 1996). In an 
overview of efforts to organise business politics over the last decade two things 
stand out. First, business leaders have been very creative and inventive. Business 
leaders have experimented with many new organisations and channels of 
influence. Second, the experimentation has resulted in few concrete victories for 
aggregate business lobbies. Interestingly, the ongoing experimentation into the 
mid-1990s reflects the continuing frustration of big business over its lack of 
collective influence in Brasilia, especially in Congress. 
*I am grateful to Peter Kingstone, Harry Makler, Gesner Oliveira, Thomas Skidmore, 
Kathleen Thelen and Kurt Weyland for comments on earlier versions and to the Center 
for International and Comparative Studies and the Institute for Policy Research at 
Northwestern University for research support. A revised version of this paper will appear 
in the Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 
Brazil's constitution and its ability to withstand efforts to amend it are the 
clearest indications of the ineffectiveness of collective business lobbying. Nearly 
all of business, and certainly all large industrialists, opposed many of the 
economic provisions of the 1988 Constitution, strongly agreed on a common 
agenda for constitutional reforms after 1993 and invested a lot of resources in 
lobbying for these reforms. An extraordinary feature of Brazilian politics over 
the past decade has been that the fundamental rules concerning taxes, social 
security, economic regulation and labour relations have been at the top of the 
legislative agenda in the late 1980s and through much of the 1990s. These rules 
profoundly affect nearly all businesses and provided strong and consistent 
incentives for collective action. In comparative and historical perspectives such 
intense and lasting centripetal incentives are very rare. Despite these incentives 
strong aggregate business organisation did not emerge and the various strategies 
adopted for collective lobbying were ineffectual in Congress. The 
ineffectiveness of business associations in lobbying for constitutional reform is 
first a story of obstacles to collective action, the primary focus of the analysis 
here. 
The collective weakness of business also has implications, considered at the 
end of the paper, for understanding Brazil's political system generally, and 
especially the lack of accountability and responsiveness of Congress within the 
overall political system. The fact that the most powerful social group in Brazil 
lacks influence in Congress suggests that this legislature is extremely 
autonomous or unaccountable. There is little evidence that the weakness of 
business has left the field open for influence by less advantaged groups. Smaller 
groups with intense interests have been effective at securing particularistic 
advantage through small groups of legislators. However, larger groups have 
been unable to advance general legislative priorities. It is especially striking that 
even the major funders of electoral campaigns, big businesses, have been unable 
to further a common business agenda in the Brazilian Congress. 
Why Business Organisation Matters 
In general, Brazil's industrialists are individually powerful yet collectively weak. 
Individual industrialists, for instance, have regular access to economic ministers. 
As Paulo Villares, president of a large steel and machinery conglomerate, put it, 
T don't need FIESP (Federation of Industry of the State of Sao Paulo), when I 
have a problem I grab the telephone and call whomever I need to' (interview, 27 
January 1993). Yet the captains of industry lack formal organisations that 
adequately aggregate their interests. Industrialists lack a strong peak association, 
research institutes, lobbies and closely associated political parties. In one 
instance of comparative contrast, by the 1990s Brazil and Colombia were the 
only major countries in Latin America without multisectoral peak associations 
that united industry, finance and commerce. Business elites created peak 
associations (sometimes including agriculture) in Chile in 1935, Venezuela in 
1944, Argentina in 1946, Mexico in 1975 and Peru in 1983 (see Durand and 
Silva, 1996). Economic elites in Brazil had conferences in the 1940s and 1970s 
designed to bring together capitalists from all lines of business. In 1987 various 
sectoral associations created the UBE (Uniao Brasileira de Empresarios) to co-
ordinate their lobbying efforts during the Constituent Assembly. However, the 
conferences disbanded and the UBE closed after the Assembly adjourned. 
In any capitalist society economic elites enjoy a political advantage, due to 
the structural dependence of state actors on private investment and the fact that 
capitalists control more political resources than other groups. In Brazil big 
industrialists have access to government decision-makers and government 
policies have generally favoured them, recent reverses on constitutional reform 
notwithstanding. What difference would organisation make? In theory, 
organisation strongly affects the kinds of interests capitalists pursue and how 
they pursue them. First, the greater the number and diversity of capitalists an 
association organises, the broader the interests it is likely to pursue. Industrialists 
have multiple interests; they can push those of their firms, their sectors, their 
position as employers, or their social class. In principle, broad peak associations 
should have a 'less parochial view than the narrow associations of which they 
are composed' (Olson, 1982, p. 50). More encompassing organisations have an 
interest in increasing total national income, whereas narrow organisations seek 
to increase their share regardless of the impact of their actions on the size of the 
whole pie. 
Second, individual industrialists and small associations with part-time 
leaders and small staffs usually only react to policies and attempt to modify their 
implementation in defence of narrow interests. Larger, better funded 
associations have the opportunity to devise longer term strategies. Full-time 
leaders with large staffs are more likely to think ahead, to attempt to set the 
policy agenda and to try to anticipate political struggles and build coalitions (see 
Moe, 1980). Third, forms of representation affect the aggregation of interests. 
Business associations typically grant voting rights to sectors (as in corporatist 
organisations), to individuals (one capitalist, one vote), or to individual firms in 
proportion to their size (often measured in sales or employment). All three forms 
bias representation in different ways, though the last, 'proportional' 
representation, is the best suited to mediating business-government relations, 
because policy-makers are generally most interested in the opinions of those 
who control the bulk of investment. In principle, the better the aggregation of 
interests, the more attentive officials are likely to be to input from association 
leaders, and the more authoritative their input will be. 
In sum, there are strong theoretical grounds to believe that the ways 
capitalists organise affect the types of collective preferences their associations 
push in politics. The relationship between organisation and power is less clear 
theoretically. There are some grounds to suspect that greater organisation 
translates into greater overall influence. Organisation is itself a political resource 
for all social groups, though it is more important when a group's strength lies in 
numbers. One empirical study of Europe found that more organised industrialists 
had greater access to decision making (Coleman and Grant, 1988). However, 
strongly organised business associations can, as Brazilian industrialists 
discovered, generate counter-mobilisation by opposition groups, which reduces 
business influence. In the end, what is theoretically clearest is that the collective 
interests of business are unlikely to be forcefully represented without aggregate 
associations. When major industrialists like Villares telephone Brasilia, they are 
more likely to talk to bureaucrats responsible for narrow measures than discuss 
broad constitutional issues with legislators. 
The representation of business is, in turn, a core concern of major theories of 
neoliberal economic reform and democratic consolidation. In their broad 
political economy of economic and political reform, Haggard and Kaufman 
(1995) claim that business was a pivotal force in driving the military out of 
power in Latin America and that business support was subsequently 
fundamental for the medium-term consolidation of neoliberal reform. In other 
theories of democratic consolidation business is a crucial social actor. For 
instance, Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens conclude that 'democracy could 
only be consolidated where elites' interests were effectively protected, either 
through direct influence of elite groups on the state apparatus or through 
electorally strong political parties' (1992, p. 156). Later they specify that 
democratic survival depended 'on the availability to elites of political 
institutions for control within a constitutional context (elite political parties or 
state corporatist institutions)' (1992, p. 163). Rueschemeyer Stephens, and 
Stephens do not devote much attention to how economic elites are organised, but 
they do imply that more encompassing organisation facilitates political 
representation and thereby democratic consolidation.1 In Brazil none of the 
major political parties could be called a party of business, so interest 
intermediation by associations carries much more of the burden of 
representation. 
For Schmitter (1992) the issue is less a binary one of consolidation or non-
consolidation but rather the quality of democracy. Schmitter breaks a democratic 
political system down into five partial regimes including a concertagao regime 
that depends on the organisation of labour and business. The functioning of each 
partial regime affects the ability of the political system overall to process 
demands and manage crises. The lack of aggregate peak associations of both 
labour and capital in Brazil's concertagao regime limits the contributions this 
partial regime can make to the overall political system (see Roxborough, 1992). 
The major general point, even beyond issues of democratic consolidation, is that 
the lack of peak associations forecloses policy options (see Streeck and 
Schmitter, 1985; Schneider and Maxfield, 1997). 
In sum, theoretical and comparative analysis directs us to the intermediation 
1 'The prerequisite for protection of elite interests was the existence of two or more 
strong competing political parties, at least one of which effectively promoted the interests 
of significant sectors of economic elites, and/or both (or all) of which allowed for direct 
access of economic elites to the policy-makers in the state apparatus. Effectiveness had 
two components, namely continued close articulation of the party leadership and/or 
policy-makers appointed by the leadership with economic elites, and capacity of the 
party to appeal to a large enough base to ensure its electoral strength,' p. 169. 
of business interest as a privileged locus for understanding the quality, capacity 
and resilience of new democracies. Given the wide variation in the aggregate 
organisation of business across Latin America, the analysis of business politics 
should occupy a central place in the comparative analysis of democratic 
consolidation.2 The following sections take a closer look at industrial 
organisations in Brazil, the attempts of industrialists to revamp them, and the 
centrifugal forces that have impeded greater articulation. The primary focus is 
initially on industry, though later sections analyse attempts at multi-sectoral 
organisation. However, the arguments on industrialists can usually be applied to 
business generally in Brazil, in that other sectors suffer from much of the same 
collective weakness. Closer attention to industry is also justified because it is the 
largest and most politically visible sector of business and because industrialists 
and their associations have taken the lead in trying to co-ordinate political 
activity with other sectors. 
Corporatist (Mis)Representation and Collective Anaemia 
Most historical studies of Brazilian business agree on its organisational 
weakness.3 Economic elites had most influence as individuals or through narrow 
sectoral organisations, and the interests they pursued were usually parochial. 
Many associations lacked strong staffs and stable leaders, and only reacted to 
government initiatives. And, most importantly, corporatist regulations distorted 
representation and impeded the proportional representation of business. In the 
1960s one central banker summed up his interaction with business leaders; 'they 
don't anticipate; they only react' (cited in Schmitter, 1971, p. 291). Other public 
officials complained that associations were unrepresentative, poorly prepared 
and usually made demands that were 'too specific', 'concerned only with small 
measures', 'mere movements without substance', 'too many palliatives' and 'too 
many special favours'. Associations at all levels were repeatedly criticised for 
their immediatism, i.e., 'their unwillingness or inability to take a longer or 
broader perspective' (Schmitter, 1971, p. 291). Industrialists generally pursued 
their 'individual self interest rather than cohesive class action' (Leff, 1968, p. 
116). During the military regime, opportunities for proactive participation in 
policy formulation were reduced and, with the exception of the anti-estatizagao 
campaign, industrialists dealt with the government largely through narrow, 
decentralised, ad hoc policy networks or 'bureaucratic rings' (Cardoso, 1975; 
Schneider, 1987; and Boschi, 1979). Despite recent organisational and political 
investments, business associations have not overcome these historic weaknesses, 
especially in terms of the lack of a peak association and the deficiencies of 
interest aggregation in corporatist organisations. 
2 For comparisons among Latin American countries, see Durand and Silva (1996), 
Bartell and Payne (1994) and Garrido (1988). 
3 See Schmitter (1971); Boschi (1979); Diniz and Boschi (1978); Payne (1994) and Leff 
(1968). For a contrary view, see Dreifuss (1981). 
At a sectoral level, Brazilian industrialists appear to be quite organised.4 
These appearances are, however, deceptive. In the mid-1990s the CNI had 
around 500 employees, a budget of $42 million (O Globo, 25 October 1995, p. 
1-19), and a range of political and semi-political programmes. Another 1,000 or 
so CNI employees administered an additional $600 million in compulsory 
contributions through SESI/SENAI (Servico Social da Industria e Servico 
Nacional da Aprendizagem Industrial) education and training programmes for 
workers. Despite these resources and the fact that all industrial firms are legally 
required to belong and to pay dues, the CNI had only modest political 
projection and little ability to aggregate, and therefore represent, industrial 
interests. On the aggregation side, the fundamental flaw was that the CNI was 
comprised of 27 state level federations, each with one vote, so that the 
Federation of Industry of Piaui, a tiny rural state, had the same vote as the 
FIESP. One result of this corporatist misrepresentation was that two of the last 
three presidents of the CNI were from the north-east, which makes little sense in 
a country where Sao Paulo accounted for more than half of total industrial 
output and the centre-south for more than two-thirds. 
CNI leaders implicitly acknowledged their difficulties in aggregating 
interests when, in 1988, they began a series of national surveys of 500-700 
managers of large and medium firms to find out how industrialists viewed the 
major issues of reform such as trade liberalisation, industrial policy and 
privatisation.5 The CNI did not even use its own membership list. They asked 
the Gazeta Mercantil (the Financial Times of Brazil) for the addresses from its 
database to mail out the questionnaire. Apparently, the CNI had no means of 
canvassing companies directly. In 1996, CNI leaders again turned to direct 
surveys of large firms rather than using CNI internal channels to compile a list of 
priority policy measures to make Brazilian industry more competitive. 
In terms of political impact, the voice of the CNI in Brasilia has historically 
been muted, in part because its staff of hundreds worked in Rio de Janeiro. Until 
recently the CNI lacked even a minimal lobbying operation. When the 
Constituent Assembly began deliberations on the new constitution, the CNI had 
only one lawyer in Brasilia assigned to monitoring Congress. In some periods, 
the CNI certainly had political access, if for no other reason than that its 
presidents were also politicians. This dual role was, however, a mixed blessing 
for industrialists. For example, Albano Franco's position in the Senate gave the 
CNI guaranteed access to top level policy-makers, but to the extent that Franco's 
loyalties were divided, the representation of industrialists' interests was 
distorted. At times Franco identified more with his party and the political class 
than with the industrialist class. For example, a new tax on financial operations 
proposed in early 1993 had strong support in Congress, yet met with nearly 
4 For background on industrial associations see Schmitter (1971) and Boschi (1979). On 
recent organisational activity in agriculture, see Payne (1991); in finance, see Barker 
(1990). 
5 See CNI (1990, 1991 and 1992). It is not clear from the publications what sampling 
method they used; however, the sectoral distribution of the sample is fairly close to that 
of total national industrial value added. 
universal opposition among industrialists, including CNI leaders. Franco 
supported the tax increase (at least as a temporary measure).6 
In light of the CNI's corporatist defects, The FIESP emerged as the de facto 
national mouthpiece for industry (Diniz and Boschi, 1988, p. 308). As an article 
in Veja put it, 'not even all the state-level federations combined, with the 
confederation (CNI) thrown in, are equal to a FIESP' (Toledo, 1992, p. 78). The 
FIESP/CIESP has an imposing organisational presence including 121 member 
associations (CIESP has 8,764 member firms), about 500 employees, a budget 
of $41 million and a 15 storey building on the Avenida Paulista (the inner 
sanctuary of the Brazilian bourgeoisie).7 Membership for all industrial firms in 
Sao Paulo is compulsory. 
Behind the imposing facade is an organisation that suffers from its own 
corporatist distortions. Marginal sectors and small and medium-size firms 
remain over-represented. For example, the Association (Sindicato) for Canes 
and Umbrellas with a dozen or so small firms has the same vote as Sindipegas 
(auto parts) with thousands of member firms, some of them huge. These 
distortions affect leadership selection. The clearest illustration of the distortions 
in corporatist representation came in the 1992 elections for the president of the 
FIESP/CIESP (discussed further below). The opposition candidate won almost 
half the votes from the over 8,000 member firms in the CIESP, but only 20 per 
cent among the 121 member associations of the FIESP. 
Not surprisingly, the president of the FIESP has often been a marginal figure 
in paulista industry and has not recently come from the ranks of Sao Paulo's 
best known and respected industrialists. Since the late 1970s, the Gazeta 
Mercantil has mailed ballots to thousands of managers and asked them to elect 
directly the business leaders of the year. These direct elections consistently elect 
leaders outside the FIESP. Mario Amato, president of the FIESP (1986-92), did 
not appear in the top ten until after he became president of the FIESP. His 
successor, Carlos Eduardo Moreira Ferreira, had not been elected directly in the 
Gazeta Mercantil poll before 1991 (Gazeta Mercantil, Balango Anual, 1989, p. 
12; 1992). Albano Franco, president of the CNI, came 13th in 1984 and 20th in 
1989 (Balango Anual, 1984, p. 9 and 1989, p. 11) 
This does not mean that unknown industrialists are incapable of representing 
collective interests. In some countries the tendency has been towards greater 
role differentiation and professionalisation, in line with the growing dominance 
of professional politicians generally. In France, for example, major spokesmen 
6 See Folha de Sao Paulo 16 January 1993, pp. 1-7 and 28 January 1993, pp. 1-8). The 
IPMF (Imposto Provisorio sobre Movimento Financeiro) was later enacted as the CPMF 
(Contribuigao). 
7 Exame, 22 July 1992, p. 29; Toledo (1992), p. 80. References to the FIESP usually 
subsume the nominally independent Centro da Industria do Estado de Sao Paulo 
(CIESP). The latter is an independent civil association founded three years before the 
FIESP in 1928. Its members are individual firms rather than sectoral organisations. The 
president of the FIESP has always also been president of t h e CIESP 
for business were usually ex-bureaucrats (Suleiman, 1978, p. 242). However, in 
Latin America many more industrialists who have first made a name for 
themselves in industry end up leading business associations, especially non-
corporatist ones. In Mexico, the leaders of non-corporatist organisations like 
Coparmex, CCE, and ABM have usually been well-known figures in big 
business of the sort that would be elected in a poll like that of the Gazeta 
Mercantil. 
Business elites themselves clearly felt that their associations lacked political 
influence. In a 1990 survey they ranked these associations 12th out of 14 
different groups, and well below individual companies in terms of influence in 
the Sarney (1985-90) government (see Table 1). Not surprisingly, business 
associations are more powerful in the eyes of other elites. However, other elites 
still rank business associations only seventh out of 14 and, most significantly, 
below unorganised business. Non-elites had similar views. Nearly 5,500 voters 
surveyed in mid-October 1992 in five state capitals ranked employers' 
associations lowest of 24 different groups and institutions in terms of prestige 
and second lowest, just ahead of candomble and umbanda centres, in terms of 
power. On both dimensions associations ranked lower than private national 
firms, banks and multinational corporations (MNCs).8 All respondents in these 
surveys agreed: the whole was less influential than the sum of the parts. 
Despite these problems the FIESP and other business associations rank 
among the most powerful associations in Brazil's civil society, though given the 
pervasive weakness of organisation in civil society this ranking does not say 
much. Leaders of business associations appear daily in the press and government 
officials consult with them constantly. Nonetheless, scholars and various groups 
in Brazil, including business groups, agreed that business associations have been 
weak relative to other political actors and relative to unorganised business. 
New Organisational Initiatives 
The amount industrialists invested in the 1980s and 1990s to bypass or reform 
existing corporatist organisations was a good indication of the dissatisfaction 
with them, and of the belief in the potential for improving the articulation and 
representation of their interests. The early years of the new civilian regime 
(1985-87) seemed a golden age for political activity by the captains of industry. 
Industrialists were viewed as pivotal participants in the coalition that had kept 
the military moving toward the barracks and this lent their new political activity 
greater legitimacy (Cardoso, 1986; Bresser Pereira 1978; Frieden, 1991; 
Haggard and Kaufman, 1995). However, in the new civilian regime they 
participated mostly as individuals - Dilson Funaro became minister of finance, 
Antonio Ermirio de Moraes ran for governor of Sao Paulo, and many others 
were elected to Congress. Somewhere between one fifth and one half of the 
8 The survey of non-elites was conducted by Datafolha and reported by JCL Noticias via 
electronic mail. 
T a b l e 1: E l i t e P e r c e p t i o n s o f I n f l u e n c e i n t h e S a r n e y G o v e r n m e n t 
pe r cen t c i t i ng ' m u c h ' or ' d e c i s i v e i n f l u e n c e ' 
Television networks 74 Television networks 72 
National Congress 70 External creditors 68 
Government tecnicos 68 Government tecnicos 61 
Political Parties 66 National banks 60 
Print Media 60 LARGE NATIONAL FIRMS 60 
External creditors 49 National Congress 55 
National banks 46 Armed Forces 55 
LARGE NATIONAL FIRMS 46 BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 54 
Unions 45 Multinational companies 52 
Armed Forces 43 Political Parties 46 
Church 40 Print Media 44 
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 25 Unions 25 
Multinational companies 21 Church 24 
Scientists and Intellectuals 4 Scientists and Intellectuals 5 
a) Other elites include union leaders, leaders of other organisations, intellectuals, journalists, 
politicians, military officers and high government officials. Question: 'In the last five years 
(Sarney government) what is the degree of influence that the following groups exercised over 
decisions in the Federal Government?' I am grateful to Bolivar Lamounier for sharing this data 
with me. See IDESP (1990) on the general methodology and results of this elite survey. 
d e p u t i e s e l ec ted in 1 9 8 6 h a d b u s i n e s s b a c k g r o u n d s . 9 A n e s t i m a t e f o r t he 1 9 9 0 
C o n g r e s s pu t the n u m b e r of ' b u s i n e s s ' d e p u t i e s at 2 0 1 or 4 0 p e r cen t ( F o l h a de 
Sao Paulo, 31 J a n u a r y 1991 , A 1 0 ) . A s tudy of the 1994 C o n g r e s s e s t ima ted that 
a qua r t e r of the C h a m b e r a n d a th i rd of the S e n a t e c a m e f r o m bus ines s . 1 0 
H o w e v e r , h o p e s f o r h e g e m o n y b y the po l i t i c i sed b o u r g e o i s i e s o o n f a d e d : F u n a r o 
lef t o f f i c e in d i sg race , A n t o n i o E r m i r i o los t a n d the bus ine s s d e p u t i e s n e v e r 
9 Rodrigues (1987) estimated that 'empresarios ' made up 32 per cent of the Constituent 
Assembly. Goes (1987) calculated that 45 per cent were tied to capital. Both calculated 
that a little over one fifth were urban businessmen (cited in Diniz and Boschi (1988, p. 
313)). 
10 Calculations by the consulting firm Monte Castelo Ideias, as reported by the Jornal do 
Brasil, 16 April 1995, p. 2. 
B u s i n e s s m e n O t h e r El i tes (a) 
formally articulated their collective legislative power as representatives of 
business. 
The Congress elected in 1986 was to write a new constitution, and business 
had every incentive to organise as a whole to influence the drafting. One of the 
most significant organisational innovations, discussed more later, was the UBE, 
which brought together various business associations in a co-ordinated lobbying 
effort (see Weyland, 1992 and Dreifuss, 1989). The UBE might have been the 
seed of a national peak organisation, but it did not outlast the Constituent 
Assembly. By 1992 prominent industrialist interviewees could hardly remember 
the UBE. 
In the late 1980s several paulista industrialists embarked on two more lasting 
organisational initiatives. In 1987 Emerson Kapaz and other young businessmen 
founded the Pensamento Nacional das Bases Empresariais (PNBE).11 Kapaz had 
been in the FIESP (he was elected president of the association for toy 
manufacturers, ABRINQ, in 1986), but quickly became impatient with its 
cumbersome procedures and outmoded policies. PNBE members were young, 
came from small and medium-sized firms from both services and industry and 
spouted progressive ideas (in 1989 Kapaz voted for the Partido da Social 
Democracia Brasileira (PSDB) candidate Mario Covas in the first round of the 
presidential elections, the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) candidate Lula in the 
second). In contrast to the FIESP, the PNBE was cross-sectoral, organised on 
the principle of one capitalist/one vote, and willing to engage more directly and 
actively in politics. They cast themselves as modern managers and supported 
unions, wage negotiations and redistribution overall. The PNBE attracted a lot 
of attention in the first year (1990) of the Collor government. Its leaders were, as 
Collor and his cabinet appeared to be, young, modern reformers. PNBE leaders 
went to Collor in mid-1990 and suggested he attempt to negotiate a social pact 
with business and labour. Government representatives subsequently met several 
times with those of business and labour, but the negotiations collapsed, due 
mostly to government disinterest (see Schneider, 1991b). A different sort of 
relationship with the Collor government sparked a subsequent moment of 
political projection. Over the course of 1992 the PNBE was one of the groups in 
civil society, one of the few business groups, to take to the streets demanding 
Collor's impeachment. 
By 1993 the PNBE had attracted about 300 subscription-paying members. 
The PNBE continued to grow over the next few years. By 1995 the PNBE had 
480 members, mostly from small and medium-size firms. The membership base 
grew more diverse as more capitalists joined from the service sector (close to 
half of all members by 1995). While 80 per cent of the members are from the 
state of Sao Paulo, the PNBE has established branches in other major cities. In 
contrast to the corporatist associations, the PNBE survives on a modest budget 
11 Much of the information on the PNBE comes from interviews with Eduardo 
Capobianco and Emerson Kapaz, co-ordinators of the PNBE, 27 January 1993, and with 
Pedro Camargo Neto, first co-ordinator, PNBE, 24 May 1995. 
of about $350,000 a year with a small staff financed out of voluntary member 
contributions ranging from $60 to $230 per month. The major themes in the 
PNBE's politics in the mid-1990s continued to be labour relations, corruption, 
ethics in politics, poverty and citizenship. They have generally tried to stimulate 
public debates on these issues, rather than attempt to push a specific legislative 
agenda in Brasilia. However, when they do lobby for constitutional reform they 
try not to do it alone. Pedro Camargo, PNBE co-ordinator in 1995, said that one 
of the lessons they learned in 1994, when business failed to advance 
constitutional reform, was that business alone was too weak (interview 24 May 
1995). The PNBE was one of the first business associations to seek out labour 
unions in an effort to find a common agenda for constitutional reform. 
After nearly a decade, the PNBE had a fairly institutionalised yet still 
precarious presence in the constellation of business associations in Brazilian 
politics. Apart from a few cameos by its most charismatic founder, Emerson 
Kapaz (by 1996 a secretary of the government of the State of Sao Paulo), the 
PNBE has not been in the political limelight (since the Collor government) or 
the vanguard of business political pressure for constitutional reform. However, 
what is most remarkable about the PNBE story is that a handful of political 
entrepreneurs could assemble a few hundred mostly small business people, raise 
a few hundred thousand dollars, and articulate a national presence and a major 
opposition to corporatism as represented in the FIESP. Projecting a collective 
agenda does not require many capitalists or resources. 
The second initiative, the Instituto de Estudos para o Desenvolvimento 
Industrial (IEDI, created in 1989), also emerged from frustrations with the 
FIESP and with the Sarney and Collor governments. Many of the IEDI's 
founders were also active members of the FIESP but unlike the young basistas 
of the PNBE they were the captains of about 30 of Brazil's largest industrial 
groups. The IEDI's members were also less concerned about issues of 
democratic politics, social welfare and relations between capital and labour. 
They wanted industrial policies and found the Sarney and Collor governments 
especially deficient (see Shapiro, 1991 and Suzigan, 1988). The FIESP did not 
help advance the agenda of industrial policy and at times made matters worse. 
During Mario Amato's term (1986-92), the FIESP's long-term proposals were 
essentially neoliberal and against state intervention in industry. Industrial policy 
is barely mentioned in the book the FIESP published with great fanfare in 
Collor's first year (FIESP 1990, especially pp. 291-323). In the view of Isto E, 
'the FIESP came into the 1990s without having formulated important proposals 
for industrial policy, or even having sought a solution to the economic crisis...' 
(5 August 1992, p. 63). A Veja report on the FIESP carried the subtitle, 
'Without Ideas of its Own, the FIESP Follows Brasilia' (6 January 1993, p. 69). 
In contrast, the idea behind the IEDI was to conduct studies, disseminate 
research, and formulate proposals for a new industrial policy. The IEDI teamed 
up with economists at the University of Campinas and started publishing studies 
and proposals (for example see IEDI, 1992). Their target audience was restricted 
to the elites of the economic bureaucracy and of industry, and they did not 
initially seek great visibility nor a mass base. 
However, the IEDI received a lot of exposure when Emerson Kapaz 
launched his opposition candidacy in the 1992 elections for president of the 
FIESP. IEDI members Paulo Francini, Paulo Villares, Claudio Bardella and 
Eugenio Staub were either on Kapaz's ticket or prominent supporters of it. The 
PNBE and IEDI had begun with different motives, but united in their opposition 
to the FIESP's traditional leadership. The election of August 1992 was the 
second contested election in the FIESP/CIESP's 64 year history and the first 
since 1979. A contested election was already a clear sign of discontent with the 
existing leadership. The fact that Kapaz was thought to be leading in the CIESP 
(a civil association with over 8,000 member firms), while Moreira Ferreira was 
ahead in the FIESP (a federation of 121 associations) demonstrated a clear split 
in forms of representation. Moreira Ferreira ultimately won both elections, 
though by a much slimmer margin in the non-corporatist association: 80 per cent 
of the associations in the FIESP, but only 52 per cent of the members of CIESP 
(Isto E, 5 August 1992, p. 62). 
This election and subsequent events weakened the PNBE and IEDI. Kapaz's 
candidacy split the PNBE and several stalwarts defected to the FIESP ticket. 
Several of the IEDI's prominent members withdrew. One alleged that the IEDI 
was nothing more than a front for the elections in the FIESP; another felt they 
had grown too protectionist (interviews, January 1993). Moreover, the firms of 
some of the founders hit especially hard economic times in 1992. Lastly, 
President Itamar Franco (1993-4) offered the Finance Ministry to the IEDI's 
president Paulo Cunha. This was a golden opportunity to implement the IEDI's 
proposals, but Cunha declined, leading some members and the press to question 
the commitment of IEDI leaders. 
In the mid-1990s, the IEDI stabilised at a fairly low level of activity 
(interviews with Mauro Arruda, executive director of the IEDI, 15 December 
1993 and 23 May 1995). A few members left and a few joined, so the total 
stayed around 30. The budget remained constant at about $350,000 (about the 
same as that of the PNBE). The IEDI also promoted debates with public 
officials and continued to advocate industrial policy, though usually in targeted 
and discrete ways, as in presenting president-elect Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
with a blueprint for industrial policy at the end of 1994. Overall though, the 
IEDI has been marginal to national debates because industrial policy has not 
been a core concern in Brasilia in any of the last three governments. On the 
major policy issues of constitutional reform, the IEDI has had little to say. 
A last indication of the dissatisfaction with the existing representation of 
business interests were the reforms high officials in the CNI and FIESP were 
pushing in the 1990s. The early impetus for many of the proposed reforms was 
to prepare for the revision of the constitution slated for 1993, in order to avoid 
the perceived failures of business articulation and lobbying during the 
Constituent Assembly. Jose Augusto Coelho Fernandes, executive director of the 
CNI, planned to expand operations in Brasilia significantly and establish a high 
speed communications network, so that the Brasilia office could inform the 
membership (probably still only member federations) of developments in 
Congress (interview, 25 January 1993). Roberto Nicolau Jeha, first secretary of 
the FIESP, also favoured greater lobbying in Brasilia, in addition to internal 
reforms to make the FIESP more democratic (i.e., reduce the number of 
'phantom' associations) and shake it free from remaining government controls 
(interview, 28 January 1993). The FIESP president Moreira Fereira advocated 
greater electoral activity, not only in terms of contributing to campaigns of 
sympathetic politicians, but also of launching candidates from the FIESP itself 
(Folha de Sao Paulo, 15 December 1992, pp. 1-4). 
The specific goals of the organisational entrepreneurs who formed the UBE, 
PNBE and IEDI differed, but they were all dissatisfied with the FIESP and CNI. 
Each initiative addressed a different organisational weakness identified in the 
previous section. The UBE was a fleeting attempt at least to co-ordinate 
lobbying, if not to create a lasting peak association. The IEDI was 
predominantly an attempt to get big industrialists more involved collectively in 
setting the agenda. The PNBE had many goals, but fundamentally challenged 
existing patterns of interest aggregation, while it also tried to get business more 
involved in agenda setting on broad social and political issues. If reformists in 
the CNI and FIESP succeed, they may be able to reincorporate the dissidents 
and create more unified and representative associations of industrialists. Until 
then, efforts such as those by the IEDI and PNBE demonstrate the perceived 
inadequacies of the FIESP, at the same time as they further fragment the 
organisation of business. 
Learning to Lobby for Constitutional Reform 
The UBE initially appeared to be an appropriate vehicle for taking advantage of 
a golden opportunity for collective input into the most general of policy debates 
over the constitution. By the time the Constitution was adopted in 1988, many 
business associations were sorely disappointed. The UBE lacked staff and 
institutional means for interest aggregation. In order to balance the 
representation of the participating associations, the UBE adopted a practice of 
rotating presidents every six months or so, which ensured a further lack of 
experience and institutionalisation on the part of UBE leaders. In the end, the 
rotating presidents used it to pursue their own agendas rather than seeking out a 
common one (interview with a senior CNI staff member in Brasilia, 27 May 
1995). Some argue that business was effective in reorganising to influence 
Congress and the Constituent Assembly (Dreifuss, 1989). However, most others, 
including many of the business participants themselves, viewed the glass as 
more than half empty. According to one report, the UBE prepared a list of 24 
essential, 'non-negotiable' demands (on labour law, interest rates, regulations on 
MNCs, etc.) on which to concentrate business lobbying, yet only one of them 
was approved (Jornal do Brasil, 4 September 1988, as cited in Figueiredo 1993, 
p. 58). 
The constitution of 1988 included a provision that the constitution be opened 
to amendment by a simple majority vote five years after its adoption. In fact, the 
constitution was slated for major overhauls every year from 1993 to 1997. So, 
the organisation of business lobbying on the Constitution over the last decade 
offers a privileged window on strategy within the business community in Brazil, 
as key participants continually learned and updated their strategies. The 
continuing experimentation with different strategies throughout 1996 shows that 
big business had yet to find an effective and satisfactory formula. 
In 1992 Mandelli, a vice president of the CNI, began mobilising for the 
revision slated for the following year. For Mandelli and others in the CNI, part 
of the aggregation problem in 1988 derived from the fact that each association 
hammered out a specific and detailed wish list before discussing its position with 
other associations. In 1992-93, the CNI held many meetings purely to discuss 
principles, without drawing up a detailed platform. Once the CNI and other 
associations had reached agreement on principles, it was easier to reach 
agreement on specific amendments. This procedure had come about by 
coincidence, and was quite successful, in the narrow reform of port legislation. 
The issue of ports had come up in a separate congressional debate. It was a 
relatively narrow issue, and all the business associations agreed, in principle, on 
lobbying for the break-up of state ownership and labour monopolies. Jorge 
Gerdau Johannpeter, the head of a large steel conglomerate, assumed informal 
leadership of business lobbying on ports because he was well known and was 
well informed about ports. Members of the CNI asked Gerdau to assume the 
same informal leadership for the constitutional revision. The lesson in more 
general terms is that the obstacles to collective action among associations 
depend in part on the process by which they seek out and define their common 
interests. 
While business seemed to have worked through some of the problems of 
aggregating interests, they still had not found the best means for articulating and 
pursuing their common interests in the public arena. In 1993 business 
associations lobbied for a loose co-ordinating body, Acao Empresarial, headed 
by Gerdau, which came out with a joint programme and a lot of publicity. 
Business positions suffered because the lobby appeared to be so big, well-
financed, powerful and at the service of the rich. By 1995 business was taking a 
very different tack. Acao Empresarial was highly organised yet almost 
completely informal and only dimly visible. It had no office, no staff, no 
position papers and no blueprint for lobbying.12 Its work was divided up among 
working groups headed by staff members from each of the major participating 
associations. In this way Acao Empresarial had no staff of its own (though it did 
have a small budget of several hundred thousand dollars, mostly for office 
expenses). Acao Empresarial was quite active in interest aggregation and in 
lobbying, but never openly in the name of Acao Empresarial. In a curious 
fashion, it would reach a consensus position that was documented in a specific 
platform, though not distributed in the name of Acao Empresarial. Actual 
12 My analysis of Agao Empresarial owes a great deal to lengthy interviews with a long-
time member of the Legislative Action Council of the CNI, 27 May 1995 and 9 
September 1996. 
lobbying based on this consensus was left up to members, but only in the name 
of that member's association. The leaders of Acao Empresarial decided that the 
whole was less influential than the sum of the parts. The bankers' association 
had a similar practice, since the 'bank lobby cannot be seen walking around the 
halls of Congress'. Febraban co-ordinated campaign contributions, later 
aggregated interests, but sent individual bankers, rather than officers of 
Febraban, to Brasilia to talk with legislators (interview with an executive of the 
Banco Real and director of Febraban, 22 May 1995). 
On the core legislative issues that affected Brazilian business in the very 
detailed Constitution, business elites opted deliberately for a low-profile and 
non-institutionalised means for intermediating, reconciling and representing 
business interests. Why? Some peculiarities of Brazilian politics probably 
affected the decision. Lobbying has always lacked legitimacy in Brazilian 
democracy (see Leff, 1968); the Portuguese neologism 'lobby', taken from 
English, lacks any positive connotations. Moreover, in Brazil's electoral system 
(proportional representation combined with unrecorded votes in Congress) 
legislators cannot be held accountable. So deputies and senators have little 
incentive to appear publicly as advocates of big business, despite their clear 
dependence on big business for campaign financing. A last motivation for the 
low profile strategy derived from a Newtonian logic: every collective action by 
business would be met by an opposite and potentially neutralising collective 
reaction. With Acao Empresarial's low profile strategy, business sought to keep 
the opposition from counter-mobilising against it. Most employers in Brazil are 
dissatisfied with the labour code in the Constitution and would like to amend or 
delete it. When this position became public, the outcry was so great that 
associations dropped it from the agenda for discussion. 
Business lobbyists in Brazil became increasingly concerned about how 
business and business political influence is viewed as narrow, self-serving and 
illegitimate. So when business mobilised again in 1995, they sought out labour 
to discuss common positions on revisions. As mentioned earlier, PNBE leaders 
took the lead in seeking common ground with labour leaders. Later the FIESP 
and CUT (Central Unica dos Trabalhadores) negotiated joint positions on some 
issues of constitutional revision, especially the fiscal reforms. In May 1995, the 
FIESP, CUT, and Forca Sindical signed a document of common demands for 
fiscal and tax reform, including taking all tax questions out of the Constitution. 
The Movement 'Reformas Sim', that included business and labour organisations, 
even took to the streets in the centre of Sao Paulo for a public demonstration in 
favour of constitutional reform (Folha de Sao Paulo, 7 May and 15 May, p. I-
7). 
Mass Mobilisation: O Encontro Nacional da Industria 
In May, 1996 nearly 3,000 industrialists flew to Brasilia to pressure the 
government, especially Congress, to accelerate the pace of constitutional reform. 
This Encontro or meeting constituted a radical departure from the low profile 
lobbying of A9S0 Empresarial. The Encontro also represents perhaps the largest 
investment in collective lobbying, considering the opportunity cost of taking the 
day off from business. Aca0 Empresarial continued its work through 1995 and 
1996, but the CNI opted to add on a more high profile complement. 
The impetus for this mass mobilisation can be traced to three sources. First, 
and most importantly, Fernando Bezerra, the new president of the CNI, adopted 
a different political profile from the moment he took office in October 1995 (see 
Gazeta Mercantile 19 October 1995, p. A-6 and 4 November 1996, p. A-6).13 In 
his first speeches he declared that the CNI was primarily an institution for 
lobbying and representing industry. Because of this function he announced that 
the CNI would move all its offices to Brasilia. In an interview Bezerra called the 
Encontro in Brazil 'a lobby with a capital L. We are not doing anything in 
secret' (Gazeta do Povo, 18 May 1996, p. 12). In addition, Bezerra was greatly 
concerned with the sectoral fragmentation of industry and wanted to use the 
Encontro to promote a unified position for industry. Bezerra offered an 
interesting interpretation in a column he wrote just before the Encontro: 
The fragmentation of business that exists today is reflected in the way the 
government discusses issues with the business classes. Although we have 
the best understanding with and great access to President Cardoso, we 
have not managed to institutionalise negotiation with other levels of 
government. We are constantly taken by surprise by initiatives that go 
completely against our interests and on which we were never even 
consulted. If we recognise that the blame is mostly ours, we will be on the 
way to a solution.14 
Second, industrialists were generally frustrated with the lack of progress on 
constitutional reforms, and many of the leaders of the state federations felt that 
more open and 'transparent' lobbying was an essential complement to Acao 
Empresarial's activities (interview with a CNI staff member, 9 September 1996). 
These concerns became especially manifest during the transition to Bezerra's 
presidency. Lastly, President Cardoso provided a last minute nudge by 
encouraging industrialists to come to Brasilia to pressure Congress. He had 
suggested a Brasilia meeting in March, and once the CNI had issued invitations 
13 After an uncharacteristic interregnum by an ex-president of the FIESP, Mario Amato, 
the presidency of the CNI reverted to an industrialist from the north-east. And, like the 
last president from the north-east, Albano Franco, Bezerra was also a senator in the 
National Congress. However, Bezerra was a marginal figure in both industry and 
politics; he was the Coca Cola bottler in the small state of Rio Grande do Norte and he 
had been elected as the substitute on another politician's ticket (O Globo, 24 May 1996, 
p. 4 and Estado de Sao Paulo, 19 June 1996, p. B6). 
14 'O fracionamento do empresariado, existente hoje, reflete-se na forma como o governo 
dialoga com as classes empresariais. Embora tenhamos 0 melhor entendimento e todo 
acesso ao presidente FHC, nao conseguimos institucionalizar a negociagao com os 
escaloes correspondentes do governo. Constantemente, somos surpreendidos com 
iniciativas que nos contrariam frontalmente, sem que sequer tenhamos sido ouvidos. Se 
reconhecemos que a culpa e, sobretudo nossa, estaremos no caminho que conduzira 
solugao' (Estado de Sao Paulo, 20 May 1996, p. 2-2). 
for the May meeting, Cardoso personally telephoned key figures like the keynote 
speaker Antonio Ermirio de Moraes to persuade them to come (Estado de Sao 
Paulo, 22 May 1996). 
The meeting itself was a great success in terms of mobilisation and collective 
action. The press issued amazed reports at the plane-loads of industrialists who 
all made their way to Brasilia. Big associations like the FIESP and the 
Federacao das Industrias do Estado do Rio Grande do Sul (FIERGS) chartered 
whole planes to ferry the industrialists to Brasilia. Moreover, the meeting 
managed to present a unified voice (and Bezerra (CNI) and Moreira Ferreira 
(FIESP) managed to overcome their differences on specific issues like interest 
rates). However, the meeting was also a stark failure in terms of bringing 
pressure to bear on Congress. In a remarkable feat of bravado, Congress voted 
down, the same day thousands of industrialists were walking the halls of 
Congress, the government proposal for reforming social security, which had the 
explicit support of the industrialists. Bezerra called it lamentable' and an 
'affront' to industry (Folha de Sao Paulo, 23 May 1996, p. 14). 
For the second half of 1996 and into early 1997 Congress shelved 
constitutional reforms in order to concentrate first on the municipal elections in 
late 1996 and the amendment to allow Cardoso to run for a second term. 
However, lobbyists for industry felt they had made some progress with the 
Executive. In fact, industrialists generally expressed satisfaction with the 
orientation, if not the policy progress, of the Cardoso government and cabinet. 
Antonio Kandir, Minister of Planning, in particular has close relations with 
industry and especially big firms tied to the IEDI. In the 1994 congressional 
elections, Kandir positioned himself as the candidate of constitutional reforms 
(interviews, 24-25 May 1995). His appointment in 1996 as Minister of Planning 
must have pleased many pro-reform industrialists. The major policy success 
industrialists noted for 1996 was Kandir's package of measures in mid-1996 to 
promote exports, which did not require congressional approval. 
Bezerra also started reforming the internal structure of the CNI in order to 
improve its capacity for interest aggregation. Over the course of 1996 Bezerra 
incorporated sectoral associations into the CNI's working committees on such 
issues as labour relations and international trade. The innovation in this strategy 
is that the associations are voluntary organisations completely outside the 
corporatist structure, that historically have had nothing to do with the CNI. Thus, 
a parallel structure may be emerging within the CNI with the state federations 
voting on some issues, including leaders, while association leaders and other 
industry 'representatives' appointed by CNI leaders do the real work of 
aggregating interests on policy issues. 
Bezerra expanded the CNI's use of opinion surveys to canvass the 
preferences of industrialists. After the Encontro in May, the CNI set about 
constructing a much more specific list of demands that Bezerra had promised to 
present to the government later in 1996. Based on interviews with managers at 
Brazil's 120 largest firms in the second half of 1996, the CNI compiled a list of 
60 suggestions to reduce costs (o custo Brasil) that Bezerra then delivered to 
President Cardoso (via his chief of staff Clovis Carvalho) in late November. 
Most of the suggestions were quite detailed (such as deadlines for paying taxes) 
and were grouped into three general areas: taxes, labour relations and trade (see 
Jornal da Tarde, 20 November 1996, pp. 9-14 and Estado de Sao Paulo, 21 
November 1996, p. B-9). the CNI promised to submit a second list drawn from 
the more than 850 suggestions made by the firms consulted. In terms of interest 
intermediation, this survey continued the practice among the corporatist 
associations to use extra-institutional channels to find out what industry 
wanted.15 However, there are two important innovations in the CNI surveys on 
trade liberalisation and competitiveness (CNI 1992-1996). First, the sampling 
does not attempt to be representative of industry as a whole, but rather covers 
only the largest firms in industry. Second, the CNI did not opt to let the data 
speak for itself by publishing the results of the survey, but rather 'intermediated' 
the data by aggregating the preferences into a list of 60 suggestions. 
In sum, 1996 represented another year of organisational activity and 
experimentation with little policy impact. When asked about the scorecard for 
constitutional reform in 1996, one CNI lobbyist responded that it was 'stuck at 
zero' (interview, 9 September 1996). Given the political calendar (municipal 
elections and the amendment for re-election) it is doubtful that any amount of 
societal pressure could have prodded Congress to action. It was a significant 
year though for further experimentation in interest aggregation and 
representation in industry. 
Conclusions 
Over the past decade, industrialists have tried many strategies and invested a 
great deal of resources in Brazilian politics in pursuit of their top priorities of 
constitutional reform. Yet, they have achieved little. Why? The simplest answers 
are twofold. The first concentrates on the continuing disarticulation of Brazilian 
business: Brazilian business associations lack the capacity to aggregate 
industrialists' interests and push a common set of preferences effectively in 
Brasilia. The second places business politics in the wider context of Brazil's 
political system and focuses on the peculiar independence of the Brazilian 
legislature from broad business interests: while individual deputies may jump to 
do the bidding of business contributors, they seem decidedly indifferent to 
collective business preferences. These two answers are linked in that the 
weakness of business associations is in part a function of the autonomy of 
legislators; rational business leaders are unlikely to invest more in collective 
organisation to lobby deputies who are consistently deaf to aggregated 
15 The FIESP, for example, conducted a survey of 262 firms in greater Sao Paulo, 
stratified by size, on the FIESP's initiative to pressure government 'in favour of 
(Constitutional) reforms'. Of those surveyed 98 per cent thought it important to pressure 
government. Moreover, 'a possible alliance with labour is well received by business: 84 
per cent thought it important...' Folha de Sao Paulo, 7 May 1996 
association intermediation. 
Why is Latin America's largest and most dynamic industrial bourgeoisie so 
disorganised and collectively anaemic? Political factors, both long and short-
term, have the greatest explanatory power, though economic forces have also 
been centrifugal.16 Industry in Brazil is diverse in terms of size, sector, location, 
conglomeration, ties to MNCs and export capacity (see Payne, 1994). However, 
heterogeneous industrialists elsewhere have organised and Brazilian 
industrialists have previously demonstrated an impressive, if fleeting, capacity 
for articulation (as in their opposition to Goulart in the early 1960s). Recent 
economic crises have been additional deterrents to collective action (interview 
with Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, 29 January 1993). As demand and profits fall, 
managers scramble to save their firms and move collective action to the bottom 
of the agenda, as witnessed in the case of the IEDI. Crisis is another plausible 
hurdle, but in other countries and in other periods crisis has triggered 
organisation.17 
Ironically, the most direct political cause of bourgeois disarticulation is state 
corporatism. Corporatism was initially a boon to business organisation (and 
supported by major industrialists), but over time it became an increasing 
impediment to effective representation. Corporatist organisations occupied 
associational space and thwarted later efforts to improve the aggregation and 
representation of business interests. Moreover, Brazilian corporatism formally 
proscribed multisectoral associations, peak or lower level. The Cardoso 
government has come out in favour of ending corporatist regulation of civil 
organisation, and leaders of major associations like the CNI, FIESP and CUT 
have endorsed such changes. Ending monopolies of representation and 
compulsory dues would decimate the coffers and structures of the FIESP and 
CNI and thereby open up vast spaces for political entrepreneurs like those who 
founded the PNBE, IEDI and Aqao Empresarial. 
The Brazilian state also had major indirect and unintended effects on 
business organisation. Collective action depended heavily on the incentive 
structure created by the state and the political system generally. The political 
exclusion during military rule, and to a lesser extent before 1964, reduced the 
threat from leftist parties and labour, so economic elites had little motive to 
organise to compete with class adversaries, in contrast to business counterparts 
in Mexico or Chile, for instance. Moreover, since the 1940s the Brazilian 
version of a developmental state had the indirect consequence of rewarding 
individual over collective action. The bureaucracy controlled extensive subsidies 
which individual bureaucrats meted out in very discretionary ways. This 
bureaucracy was porous and vulnerable to outside pressures, in large part 
because top positions were filled by personal, political appointment (see 
Schneider 1991a). Thus, industrialists had every incentive to spend their time 
16 See Weyland (1992, 1996) for arguments similar to the ones developed here. 
17 See, for example, Schattschneider (1935) on business politics in the United States 
during the Depression and Schneider and Maxfield (1997) on a broader range of 
developing countries. 
cultivating connections in the state to further individual interests, rather than 
investing in organisations with broad collective agendas. In theory, collective 
action is difficult, even for small groups of economic elites with a great deal of 
resources at their disposal. In Brazil, patterns of state intervention in the 
economy, as well as in associational life, made organised action even more 
problematic. 
Some centrifugal incentives faded along with the developmental state in the 
1980s when the state ran out of subsidies, and labour and the left mobilised. Yet 
other political factors continued to foster disarticulation. For example, the 
fragmentation of the party system, and of legislative representation more 
generally, dissipated input from organised business into legislative politics. 
Industrialists voted for a range of parties, so their business associations could 
not afford to become too close to any one party (Jose Augusto Coelho 
Fernandes, executive director of the CNI, interview 25 January 1993). Despite 
an abundant flow of resources into electoral campaigns, capitalists lacked a 
party of business, or even an identifiable group or caucus (banca) of politicians 
from different parties who might be mobilised in the collective interests of 
business. For example, construction firms contributed a great deal of resources 
to electoral campaigns, yet lacked articulated sectoral power. As an official in 
Sinduscon (Sindicato da Industria da Construsao Civil) lamented: 
There are a great number of congressmen who are closely tied to 
construction firms ... but this does not mean that the sector has a great 
deal of political power. So, there is a great potential for political 
articulation in Congress... (a construction firm) thinks it is important to 
have a Deputy in Congress. So, there is a close relationship. Many times 
the firm helps in the campaign. But this does not help the sector. Each one 
is worried about his own little problem. So, what is our idea? It is to have 
the sector as a whole discuss fundamental issues and then have the firms 
work on their Deputies to get a good result out of Congress, to establish 
political linkage. (Interview, 27 January 1993) 
In other words, one of the most politically active sectors cannot get 'its' 
deputies to act collectively in the common interests of the sector. Why do 
business contributions to campaigns not buy more collective influence? The 
anecdote at the outset about Pedrinho Abrao shows how votes for particular 
projects are available for purchase, but general business financing cannot be 
mobilised to get a majority vote in Congress on constitutional reforms. In 
general, the electoral system (especially open lists and proportional 
representation) makes Brazilian deputies some of the least accountable in the 
world. They do not have to answer to parties or voters. Voters in fact rarely even 
remember for whom they voted. However, campaign contributors have 
incentives to watch how their candidates vote, so business should in fact have far 
more influence, since legislators are not subject to countervailing pressures from 
parties, voters and other social groups. Brazilian deputies are freer than most 
politicians elsewhere to cater to their contributors. Yet they do not appear to, 
certainly if one believes the complaints of business contributors. Without more 
empirical research on campaign financing, alternative hypotheses on the 
apparent unresponsiveness of legislators to their financiers have to be mostly 
speculative.18 One (null) hypothesis is that legislators are in fact responsive to 
demands, yet business makes only particularistic claims. Perhaps business 
contributors give money to candidates with the expectation and implicit bargain 
that the successful candidate will broker relations with the Executive. In other 
words, business people want their delegates in Brasilia to take care of their 
contracts and subsidies, but leave it to the politicians to decide how to vote on 
general policy issues. A second hypothesis is that legislators do not care if a 
particular business contributes to their campaigns when they run for re-election. 
In large districts, like the state of Sao Paulo, deputies may have so many 
possible sources of finance from business, that they do not have to worry about 
pleasing past supporters. Here business associations could fulfil a collective 
accounting function, as unions do, but business associations apparently do not. 
If these hypotheses and speculations on the political sources of the collective 
anaemia of business are on target, then there are few reasons to expect business 
alone to be able to resolve its own 'disintermediation'. At the same time, there 
are also few grounds for considering this disintermediation of collective interests 
to be an institutionalised feature of Brazilian democracy. The electoral and 
corporatist systems are on the reform agenda and even small alterations in these 
systems could rapidly change the collective representation of business. 
18 There is little empirical research on campaign financing. The best source to date is 
Kinzo, 1997. 
Ill: Unions in Times of Reform 
Maria Herminia Tavares de Almeida 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, Brazil has been undergoing a broad process of 
economic reform that is reshaping the functions and structures of the state. Trade 
liberalisation, privatisation, public administration and civil service reforms are 
simultaneously redefining the state's role and remaking its administrative 
apparatus. 
Although the direction of change is similar to that in other countries all over 
the world, the timing, pace and extent of the Brazilian reform process seem to be 
distinctive. Brazil is a late and moderate reformer, at least compared to its Latin 
American neighbours. Economic reform in Brazil is an extremely cautious and 
negotiated process of change. Several political, bureaucratic and social actors 
participate in this negotiation and influence its results.1 
What is the importance of unions in this process? Do they have any 
significant sway in economic reform ? What are the sources of their power and 
what accounts for their capacity (or incapacity) to influence the reform process? 
There is no one simple answer to these questions. Unions' clout certainly 
varies considerably according to the specific feature of state reform under 
consideration. In this paper I attempt to address those questions of relevance to 
unions' influence, with respect to one dimension of state reform: the 
privatisation of public enterprises and public services. I compare the 
privatisation of state-owned steel and petrochemical firms and the concessions 
for private exploitation of public ports. I maintain that unions' capacity to 
influence reform policies depends less on the nature and size of their own power 
resources than on the institutional setting of the state's decision-making process 
regarding reform. 
In the first part, I briefly discuss different analytical approaches to the issue 
of unions' capacity to influence policy decisions. In the second, I give a short 
description of the main features of the Brazilian system of interest 
intermediation, stressing its recent institutional trends. In the third, I compare 
two situations of reform policy in which unions, with similar power resources, 
revealed very different capacities for influencing policy-making and policy 
implementation. 
11 discuss this at length in Tavares de Almeida (1996, pp. 213-34) 
Power resources and institutional opportunities 
The conventional analysis of unions' power is embedded in the pluralist 
tradition. Pluralism treats power as an intrinsic attribute of collective or 
individual agents that stems from their social circumstances. The pluralist 
approach to unions' power emphasises the importance of resources such as 
union size; financial assets; ability to build strong bureaucratic apparatuses; 
spatial concentration of union membership; and capacity for mass mobilisation, 
especially the ability and strength to organise and sustain strikes. Some power 
resources arising from institutional arrangements, such as the control of job 
opportunities in closed-shop systems, are also considered. Nevertheless, the 
emphasis is rather on those resources related to the social characteristics of the 
union members as a group, such as the degree of spatial concentration and skills 
of the workforce. The union's size and its ability to organise strikes are the two 
most popular indicators of its power. 
The literature on neo-corporatism criticised pluralist theory not only because 
it assumed the universality of the pluralist pattern of interest organisation, but 
also for its incapacity to assess the importance of institutional features in 
different political and policy outcomes. At the beginning of the 1970s, Schmitter 
(1974) showed that neo-corporatism was an important, if not dominant, pattern 
of interest intemediation in Western Europe and that there was a strong 
correlation between corporatist arrangements and social harmony2 (Schmitter 
and Lehmbruch, 1982).3 In other words, there were close affinities between 
modes of interest organisation and modes of policy formation. Further research 
has shown that corporatism helped to restrain industrial conflict (Hibbs, 1987; 
Korpi and Shalev, 1980) and contributed to more efficient policies to cope with 
inflation and unemployment (Berger, 1983, Rowthorn and Glyn, 1987). 
According to this approach, union power is no longer an attribute of social 
groups, but depends heavily on features of the corporatist organisation, such as 
its degree of centralisation,4 its extension and representational monopoly. Power 
also relies on the political resources produced by participation in procedures to 
mediate conflict. 
The literature on neo-corporatism made a strong, but qualified, 
institutionalist statement: corporatist institutions matter, they make concertacao 
possible and enhance the probability of specific policy outcomes. This literature 
also gave new emphasis to where sources of power should be sought: from their 
social basis to the institutional features that moulded the interest organisations 
and defined their relations to the government. However, it said little about the 
relevance of an institutional approach to the analysis of groups' influence on 
2 The Portuguese word for this is concertagao: there is no simple translation for the word 
into English, and so I have used the Portuguese in this paper. 
3 Monopoly of representation and especially centralisation, both essential traits of 
corporatist structures, were thought to further concertagao. 
4 Lehmbruch (1982, p. 10) defines centralisation as the 'accumulation of decision power 
in the peak associations'. 
policy-making of non-corporatist polities and when concertacao is not the name 
of the game. Neocorporatist literature accepted the pluralist statement about the 
affinity between pluralist organisation and pressure politics, but did not discuss 
the possible institutional sources of group influence in these circumstances. 
Nevertheless, institutions are as important in pluralist settings as they are in 
corporatist ones, and power resources are conditioned and defined by their 
specific features. 
Tsebelis (1995) and Immergut (1996), quite coincidently, suggested a 
(neo)institutionalist model for the comparative analysis of policy change in 
terms of veto players5 whose power is institutionally embedded. Tsebelis 
considers two types of veto players: institutional ones, whose number and 
competence are defined in the Constitution and vary according to the system of 
government; and partisan veto players. The number, internal cohesion and 
shared interests among different veto players is decisive for policy change, but 
this becomes more difficult when the number of veto players increases and their 
shared interests and internal cohesion decrease. 
More interested in analysing the capacity of interest organisations to 
influence policy change, Immergut considers the political institutions as a 
particular structure that allows for the existence of different veto points where 
unions and other interest groups can exert influence to block or promote change. 
The number and position of veto points depend on the constitutional rules, the 
party system and electoral results. 
In both models institutions are not self-sufficient explanatory variables. They 
explain policy change, but they do not do it alone. Distribution of preferences is 
important in determining the degree of cohesion either of institutional or partisan 
veto players in Tsebelis's model. The same is true for Immergut who emphasises 
the importance of electoral results in determining changes in the position and 
strategic importance of veto points. 
This paper aims to explore the explanatory capacity of the veto points-veto 
players analytical framework at two moments of policy change. The first is the 
creation of the legal framework for policy reform and the second is the 
implementation of the new policy. The structure of veto points is different at 
both moments as are the veto players. At the legislative moment the veto players 
are the Executive, the Congress, the political parties, and occasionally the 
Judiciary. Interest groups may influence decisions through their relations to 
some of the players, but do not have institutional veto capacity. Congruence 
among different veto players and their internal cohesion is crucial. At the 
implementation moment the different actors in the Executive are an important 
veto player - ministers, governmental agencies, the Presidency - the Judiciary 
may also be another and interest groups strategically placed may block policy 
5 According to his definition 'veto players are individual or collective actors whose 
agreement (by majority rule in the case of collective actors) is required for a change in 
the status quo' (Tsebelis, 1995). 
implementation. Here coherence is important, especially between the Executive 
and the Judiciary, but internal cohesion of all relevant players is essential. 
The two cases of privatisation discussed here may be particularly interesting 
since they present two different outcomes, although the institutional framework 
was the same and the characteristics of the unions involved were very similar. 
These two cases allow me to explore the interplay of institutions and preference 
distributions in the process of policy change. First, however, it is important to 
outline, if briefly, the Brazilian interest intermediation system. 
Corporatism in decline 
The Brazilian interest intermediation system is in transition. Corporatism, that 
prevailed for more than fifty years, is declining as the institutional, as well as the 
systemic, conditions that nurtured it are changing. The Brazilian interest 
intermediation system, established in the 1930s, has been for decades a peculiar 
case of state corporatism (Schmitter, 1974). It combined monopoly of 
representation, granted by the government and guaranteed by law, with a 
deconcentrated and rather decentralised system. Municipal unions6 were placed 
at the core of a hierarchical structure, where state federations by branch and 
eight national sectoral confederations constituted the upper levels. No shop floor 
organisation existed and no legal warranty was ever granted to union 
representatives at firm level. Until 1985, no peak association was allowed to 
exist. A compulsory contribution paid by all workers (or firms in the case of 
entrepreneurs' organisations), whether unionised or not, provided the funds to 
finance the system's operation. State corporatism replaced direct collective 
bargain by a sophisticated system of labour courts and administrative arbitration. 
During the previous democratic period (1946-64) corporatist structures were 
a two-way route of communication between the government and the unions. The 
Ministry of Labour exercised a sometimes repressive, sometimes paternalistic, 
control over the unions. When government preferred populist measures to 
repression or bureaucratic control, labour leaders had direct, although informal, 
access to Executive decision-making arenas.7 Concertacao was never a 
government option for policy-making, but labour leaders were frequently co-
opted by populist governments. Therefore, corporatist structures allowed union 
leaders some degree of political influence, that depended less on the size of the 
unions, or their capacity to mobilise, than on their political closeness to the 
president and other members of the governing coalition. 
During the authoritarian regime (1964-84), the repressive features of the 
6 Or municipal entrepreneurs' organisations, since the structure is a symmetrical one for 
workers and firms. 
7 Labour and entrepreneurial representatives participated in tripartite comissions that 
defined the minimum wage increases and in those that established the 'categories' that 
should be the constituency of the unions. They also had seats in labour courts through 
the judges appointed by unions and business organisations. 
state corporatist model were reinforced and became a powerful tool to impose 
labour quiescence and wage restraint. However, since the end of military rule 
important changes have occurred, both in the legal framework and in the actual 
functioning of the system. All mechanisms that provided for state control over 
union activities were abolished as early as 1985. Unions became autonomous in 
relation to the government. 
As a result of unions' mobilisation against the military government and of 
their internecine political differences, several peak organisations emerged 
outside the legal intermediation structure, adding a pluralist roof to the 
corporatist building. Their number and relative strength varied during the 1980s; 
the latest data showing the distribution of union membership to peak 
associations are in Table 1. 
Table 1 - Union membership in peak associations (1991) 
T\ }H ( I T U'l'H ( €.12 LSI IS Total Lnions 
Employees(a) 843 114 58 22 192 3,547 
Liberal professions 79 3 1 - 1 376 
Other (b) 29 15 10 2 6 340 
Total urban 951 132 69 24 199 4,263 
Rural 605 35 14 - 13 2,905 
Total 
(urban + rural) 
1,556 167 83 24 212 7,168 
Source: Anudrio Estatfstico do IBGE -1994 
Note: CUT = Central Unica dos Trabalhadores (Partido dos Trabalhadores); 
CGT1 = Central Geral dos Trabalhadores; CGT2 = Confedera l Geral dos 
Trabalhadores ; US I = Uniao Sindical Independente; FS = Forga Sindical. 
* includes members and non-members 
(a) includes workers and employees in industry, commerce, banking, 
transportation, public administration, education and culture. 
(b) includes self-employed and temporary employees. 
Table 1 shows that there is a significant number of unions (72%) not related 
to any of the five peak associations. In fact, only three of them still exist today: 
CUT, FS and CGT2; only the first two are politically significant. The CUT's 
importance stems not only from its grip on the most important workers' unions 
in modern industry, the rural sector and civil servants associations, but also from 
its intimate link to the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT). The FS built its identity 
as the major opponent of the CUT and consequently as an alternative to those 
labour leaders who do not back the PT. Its moderate discourse also has drawn 
sympathy, and frequently some material support, from all governments since its 
creation in 1989. 
Sharp political differences divide the two major national organisations on the 
issues of state reform.8 CUT leaders and followers oppose either market-oriented 
economic changes or social security, administrative and civil service reforms. 
The FS is more prone to accept and negotiate them. 
The 1988 Constitution confirmed the changes made in previous years and 
introduced others that contributed to create a very strange hierarchical structure 
combining corporatism at union level and pluralism at the top.9 
Within the new Constitution's framework, decentralisation of the interest-
intermediation system increased significantly - probably induced by the absence 
of bureaucratic controls and the multiplication of compulsory contributions. 
While union membership in the urban areas dropped slightly from 1979 to 1994, 
the number of unions grew dramatically after 1988. New unions in 1990 and 
1991 were 22% of those already in existence in 1990, and in 1992 a further 
11.5% of those in existence in 1990 were created. Only 25% of the growth since 
1990 is due to unionisation of civil servants, forbidden to organise under 
previous Brazilian constitutions. Tables 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 show the evolution of 
unionisation and the process of organisational multiplication and fragmentation. 
While the Brazilian corporatist system has lost the legal provisions that made 
for its structural coherence, political conditions do not favour its survival either. 
The long life of corporatist arrangements was due to the vested interests of 
labour leaders and of union, government and labour court bureaucracies. 
Nevertheless, government interest in using corporatist structures either to control 
or co-opt unions and business organisations definitely contributed to their 
perpetuation. Corporatist organisations were part and parcel of a specific mode 
of relationship between the state and society that some authors called the state-
centred matrix (Cavarozzi, 1988), which went with the import-substituting 
model of growth and state intervention. 
8 The political division is in some respects prior to the definition of the state reform 
agenda, but since the latter became the major political cleavage of the 1990s it grew into 
the great divide inside the labour movement. 
9 Unions' monopoly of representation was maintained, but no provision was made to 
establish who would recognise the union and grant it exclusive representation, thus 
making room for dispute over jurisdiction. Compulsory funds were preserved, and even 
enlarged, with the creation of two new universal and compulsory financial contributions. 
On the other hand, pluralism at peak level was confirmed. 
Table 2: Brazil: Union Size, 1939 - 1995 
(per cent) 
Urban (a) Total (b) 
1940 8.0 
1960 12.2 
1970 13.8 
1979 11.6 23.1 
1988 10.8 24.9 
1990 10.5 23.5 
1995 10.7 14.6 
Source: FIBGE: PNAD e Indicadores Sociais. 
(a) urban population only excluding self-employed 
(b) urban and rural population 
Table 3 - New entrepreneurial and workers' organisations 
Brazil - rural and urban sectors, 1990-96 
Rural 16 90 63 26 72 83 5 355 
Urban 1,255 1,301 701 626 386 372 38 4,679 
Total 1,271 1,391 764 652 458 455 43 5,034 
Source: Ministerio do Trabalho 
Unionised! workers/ Y ear 
Working population 4 r r ) 
I 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Total ^ H 
Table 4 - New entrepreneurial and worker's organisations 
1990-1996 
Source: Ministerio do Trabalho 
Table 5 - New entrepreneurial and workers' organisations 
by sector -1990-96 
Source: Ministerio do Trabalho 
Note: 1 - Employers' organisations 
2 - Workers' unions 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Total 
Employers 206 270 217 125 150 160 15 1,143 
Employed 987 1,027 508 502 274 271 j 251 3,594 
Subtotal 1,193 1,297 725 627 424 4311 ~40| 4,737 
Autonomous 42 46 19 7 13 9 1 137 
Liberal 36 
_ 
""""20 21 15 2 160 
professions 
Subtotal 78 94 ~ 2 5 34 24 3 297 
Total 1,271 1,391 764 652 458 455 43 "T034 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Total 
Industry 1 78 91 70 21 36 _ 31 5 332 
Industry 2 237 234 110 83 56 49 2 771 
: Commerce 1 _ 88 111 89 47 41 50 6 432 
1 Commerce 2 218 135 86 70 63 9 820 
(Transport 1 14 22 6 15 £ 7 1 73 h™— "" • — 
^Transport 2 14 64 36 25 16 29 4 188 
, Rural 1 14 20 40 24 55 57 3 213 
Rural 2 2 70 23 1 38 JL1 26 2 178 
Banking 1 2 3 L 4 4 2 2 0 17 
Banking 2 25 11 8 5 4 5 1 59 
Autonomous 42 46 19 7 13 9 1 137 
; Liberal professions 36 48 18 21 15 2 160 
Education & culture 1 10 7 ! 10 5 _ 9 0 42 
Education & culture 2 58 64 35 j 38 13 17! 0 225 
Media & public 
relations 1 
9 13 1 
1 i 
i 4 3 4 0 34 
Media & public 
relations 2 
12 12 0' 
! 1 
43| 5 0 0 72 
| Civil servants 2 400 354 161 ! 184 93 82 7 1281 
Total 1271 1391 764 652 458 455 43 5034 
Table 6 - New entrepreneurial and workers' organisations 
by sector - 1990-1996 (%) 
Industry 1 1.5 1.8 1.4 0.4 0.7 | 0.6 1 0.1 6.61 
Industry2 4.7 4.6 2.2 I 1.6! 1.1! 1.0 1 0.0 15.3! 
Commerce 1 1.7 2.2 L8 0 9 L 0 8 1 0 1 0.1 86^ 
Commerce2 4.7 4.3 ! 11 1 7 1 4 1 3? 0 2 16.3| 
Transport 1 0.3 0.4 0.1 0 3 ! 0.2 0 1 0.0 1.51 
Transport 2 0.3 1.3 0.7 0 5 \ 0.3 0 6 0.1 
\ —| 
• 3 7 
Rural 1 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.5 | l . l j 1.1 0.1 4.2 
Rural 2 0.0 1.4 0.5 0.8 ! 0.3 ! 0.5 0.0 3.5 
Banking 1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 o . o i o . o 0.0 0.3 
Banking 2 0.5 0.2 0.2 o . i ; o . i 0.1 0.0 1.2 
Autonomous 0.8 0.9 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.0 2.7 
Liberal professions 0.7 1.0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.0 3.2 
Education& culture 1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.8 
Education& culture 2 1.2 1.3 0.7 0.8 0.3 0.3 0.0 4.5 
Media & public 
relations 1 
0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.7 
Media & public 
relations 2 
0.2 0.2 0.0 
i 
0.9 = 0.1, 0.0 0.0 1.4 
Civil servants 2 7.9 7.0 3.2 3.7: 1.8 1.6 0.1 25.4 
Total 25.2 27.6 15.2 13.0* 9.1 9.0 0.9 100.0 
Source: Ministerio do Trabalho 
Note: 1 - Entrepreneurs' organisations 
2 - Workers' unions 
At this time, the broad systemic conditions that created and contributed 
towards reproducing state corporatism are withering away. State-society 
relations are changing as much as government policies towards interest 
organisations. Vested interests continue to exist and account for the persistence 
of corporatist arrangements, even if awkwardly combined with pluralist 
institutions. However, transition towards some kind of pluralist system does 
seem to be in process. 
Corporatism is now decentralised and in decline. It also lacks political 
cohesion. Under these circumstances, different peak organisations or individual 
unions tend to act basically as pressure groups with decentralised strategies. 
Inside the corporatist system, public sector unions form an important, but far 
from homogeneous group. Civil service unions are recent, numerous (1,281 in 
the whole country), extremely vocal and almost unanimously subscribed to the 
CUT, where they hold important power positions. 
• Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Total H 
Workers and employees of state-owned enterprises (SOE) are represented by 
municipal unions at the sectoral level - metal-mechanic, chemical, oil, 
electricity, railway, etc. - or by professional unions in the case of port workers -
stevedores, longshoremen, drivers, etc. In both cases, the unions have existed for 
many years. Together, SOE and port unions have very high levels of 
unionisation compared to the private sector. However, they vary greatly as far as 
political allegiances are concerned. Port unions do not belong to any of the peak 
organisations; they are represented at the federal level by three different national 
federations. They live in a union world of their own with weak relations to other 
labour organisations. Their internal cohesion is very high, inside each union as 
much as among different unions and federations. At present, they do not have 
established relations with political parties, but their leaders are very efficient at 
lobbying Congress. 
On the other hand, the loyalty of unions organising workers and employees 
of SOE are divided between the CUT, FS and CGT2. Union cohesion is not 
always great and they frequently have a high degree of internal competition. 
Cohesion also varies among unions in the same sector nationwide. Peak 
organisations, confederations and some prominent unions regularly lobby 
Congress. The CUT's unions have very close ties to the PT and also have good 
relations with the Democratic Labour Party (PDT) and the small leftist parties 
in Congress. 
Unions and privatisation policies 
In general terms, Brazilian unions have shown little capacity to influence the 
process of economic reform. Nevertheless, they have been more successful in 
some cases than in others in influencing the legislative process or blocking 
reform implementation. 
For unions, port reform - or rather its absence - has been a success story so 
far; privatisation of state-owned steel and petrochemical enterprises, on the other 
hand, was a clear failure. In both cases, unions opposed the reform proposals. In 
both cases, unions were strong, if measured by conventional indicators: high 
levels of unionisation, high degree of territorial concentration and significant 
capacity to mobilise their constituencies. Port unions have succeeded in 
influencing the lawmaking process and have been able to block law 
implementation. Steel and petrochemical SOE unions did not have a say in the 
legislative process that produced the legal framework for the privatisation of 
public enterprises and failed to block its implementation. 
Port reform and privatisation are important issues in the wider agenda of 
state reform. In the first case, increasing the efficiency of port services was seen 
as an important condition for the external opening of the Brazilian economy. 
Port services were thought to be expensive and highly inefficient and the 
prevailing dock labour scheme seemed to contribute significantly to this 
situation. Changing the dock labour scheme meant, among other reforms, 
breaking closed-shop procedures that accounted for the hiring monopoly of port 
unions and its control over the whole labour process inside the ships and on the 
waterfront. 
In 1993, the Executive sent Congress a draft law that proposed radical and 
immediate changes in port institutions, and especially in the dock labour scheme. 
Port unions, particularly those in Brazil's biggest public port, succeeded in 
mobilising a broad coalition, consisting of local community leaders, leftist 
parties and the mayor, to press Congress for their claims. Inside Congress some 
representatives and a senator acted as spokespersons for their demands. The 
congressional debate was heated, representatives' preferences were split, and the 
proposition received 130 amendments. The whole legislative process took six 
months, and the resulting law was partially vetoed by the Executive. The result 
was institutional reform that established a transition period for changing the 
dock labour scheme and granted the unions representation on all-important port 
administrative councils. 
The port unions therefore influenced the legislative process and were 
partially successful in their efforts to defend their interests. They continued to 
oppose the law's implementation, threatening to paralyse Brazilian ports, with 
significant losses for the state and employers. Nevertheless, their main asset was 
not the strength of this organisation and the capacity to mobilise workers, but 
rather the sympathy and support of administrative bureaucracies in the ports, 
who were also unwilling to face change. The alliance between unions and 
bureaucracies has been crucial in blocking port reform since 1993. 
By contrast, unions had no participation in the process of drafting Law 
8031/90 that established the institutional framework for the privatisation 
process, defining its basic norms and procedures, its regulatory framework, the 
public enterprises to be privatised and the agreed forms of payment. Congress 
did introduce some changes in the original proposition, among them the 
participation of workers' representatives in the National Commission and the 
compulsory sale of 10% of the enterprises' shares to employees.10 However, 
unions remained alienated from the debate and the decision-making process. 
Differences between the Executive and the Congress were not too deep, and 
there seemed to be significant internal cohesion in Congress regarding 
privatisation as it was defined in the draft law.11 
When privatisations began, unions tried to block them with appeals to the 
Supreme Court and fundamentally through mass mobilisation and public 
10 There were 220 amendments to the original proposition, but only 12 were approved. 
These included two that favoured workers and their representatives. Nevertheless both 
were vetoed by the Executive. 
11 Elsewhere (Tavares de Almeida and Moya, 1996) we have shown that sectors 
included in the programme were precisely those whose privitasation achieved the 
greatest consensus among Congress members. 
demonstrations.12 Judicial procedures did not succeed to the same extent as mass 
mobilisation. Unions were divided on the issue. The members of the CUT 
opposed privatisation fiercely, while FS members approved it. In order to 
undermine the unions' efforts at mobilisation, the administration offered 10% of 
the shares to workers and stimulated the organisation of firm-level employees' 
clubs to buy them. Inside each steel and petrochemical firm high-level public 
executives tended to favour privatisation, which was seen as way of freeing 
firms from excessive bureaucratic regulations and of bringing in new 
investments that the government could no longer provide. The unions, divided 
and alone, could not provide any effective resistance, despite the number of their 
members, the bureaucratic strength of their organisation and the mobilisation 
resources of their leaders. 
The conclusions that can be drawn seem to be clear. In the port reform 
process the different perspectives of the Executive and the Congress and the low 
degree of cohesion inside the Legislature created veto opportunities for port 
unions, themselves very cohesive and capable of mobilising important political 
allies. Veto opportunities also emerged in the implementation phase due to the 
lack of cohesion inside the Executive. The situation was the opposite when 
privatisation of steel and petrochemical firms was under consideration. This time 
powerful unions could exert no veto at all, since institutional arrangements and, 
above all, distribution of preferences, among and inside relevant political 
institutions, did not create the appropriate conditions. 
In Brazil, privatisation and other important state reforms are still in the 
making. Until now it has been a highly negotiated process. The Brazilian 
institutional framework allows for an extremely complex structure of veto points 
and veto players, that change for each specific reform policy. Unions may 
influence the reform decisions and the course of change, but their impact 
depends heavily on institutional opportunities. 
Unions organised street rallies on the days and in the locations where public 
enterprises were to be sold. Although this achieved media visibility, it had no real 
impact. 
IV: Regional Interest Intermediation in Brazil: The 
Impact of Federalism and Decentralisation 
Celina Souza 
With the promulgation of the 1988 Constitution, Brazil became a very 
decentralised country in the distribution of political and financial resources 
(Souza, 1992; 1994; 1996). The 1988 Constitution was the result of the 
country's commitment to democratic values, in which political, financial and 
administrative decentralisation fulfilled an important role. Nevertheless, after the 
promulgation of the Constitution, the role of the state, especially that of the 
federal government, as a provider of social and economic benefits as well as its 
responsibility for evening out inequalities among Brazilian states and regions, 
has had to face many challenges, while the so-called market mechanisms have 
been gaining salience. Furthermore, economic reforms, especially those 
designed to control inflation, have been reducing support from the federal 
government to the states for the provision of infrastructure and local and 
regional public services. 
At the federal level, the results of decentralisation are quite clear: the federal 
government is particularly affected by financial constraints and is finding it 
difficult to build governing coalitions, although it has been finding ways to 
overcome those difficulties, as shown by Limongi and Figueiredo (1996) and 
Souza (1997). At the sub-national level, however, the results of decentralisation 
present a high level of heterogeneity given the country's regional disparities and 
the uneven power possessed by regional leaders. 
Brazil has been marked, from the beginning of its republican history, by the 
existence of deep-rooted regional inequalities within the federation. The latest 
report by the United Nations Development Programme and the Instituto de 
Pesquisa Economica Aplicada (UNDP and IPEA, 1996) brought to the fore the 
existence of three 'Brazils', composed of i) an area constituting seven states in 
the south of the country which, together with the Federal District, share a high 
level of human development; ii) an area towards the north-west, starting in 
Minas Gerais, which has a medium level of human development; and iii) an area 
composed of the states of the north-east plus the states of Para and Acre, which 
is characterised by low levels of human development.1 These results depict a 
new map of Brazilian regions, somewhat different from the traditional 
geographic map which divides Brazil into five regions. 
1 The states of Rio Grande do Sul, Sao Paulo, Santa Catarina, Rio de Janeiro, Parana, 
Mato Grosso do Sul, Espfrito Santo, plus the Federal District, belong to the first 
category. In the second category are the states of Minas Gerais, Goias, Mato Grosso, 
Rondonia, Amazonas, Roraima, and Amapa. In the third group are the states of Para, 
Acre, Sergipe, Bahia, Pernambuco, Rio Grande do Norte, Maranhao, Ceara, Piauf, 
Alagoas, and Paraiba. 
This paper examines the relationship between the states and the federal 
government after decentralisation, as well as the impact of the ongoing 
constitutional reforms in that relationship. These issues are discussed focusing 
on Brazil's regional inequalities, given the fact that these inequalities have 
caused new tensions to the federal equilibrium which was achieved by the 1988 
Constitution and agreed during the transition to democracy. The paper argues 
that the Brazilian experience on political and financial decentralisation favours 
the prospects of democratic consolidation in Brazil, through the emergence of 
new political actors in the political scene and the existence of several power 
centres competing among themselves. The state governors, especially those 
governing economically powerful states, and the mayors of the state capitals, 
became one of the main centres of power, compelling the federal government to 
negotiate with the sub-national spheres the solution of national issues. In this 
sense Brazil became not only more democratic but also more 'federal'. On the 
other hand, the Brazilian experience shows that decentralisation might impede 
the reduction of the country's regional inequalities, because of the financial and 
political weakening of the federal government. 
The paper first presents a conceptual discussion of intergovernmental 
relations as a conflict-ridden process; it then provides an overview of the main 
economic and social features of the Brazilian states and regions, showing the 
degree of regional inequality. Following this the paper discusses the ways in 
which the states have been using their political strength to negotiate their 
financial constraints. Finally, a review of the ongoing legal reforms, either 
constitutional or those under way through ordinary or complementary legislation 
to the Constitution, are presented and the impact of those reforms upon state-
federal government relations are discussed. 
A Political Approach to Intergovernmental Relations2 
The emergence of the nation-state has expanded the role of governments and 
increased concerns regarding the distribution of governmental power. In federal 
countries, the main question with which intergovernmental studies are concerned 
is: how do central and sub-national governments work to solve shared problems? 
Throughout this century complex sets of machinery and of linkages in 
Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) have been developed.3 However, most of the 
theoretical contributions on IGR in federal countries are based on the 
experiences of the USA, Canada and Australia, which tend to emphasise an 
Anglo-Saxon view of the issue. Furthermore, many studies have tended to treat 
IGR as related to service delivery, financial stringencies and regulatory 
measures.4 
2 A more detailed discussion is presented in Souza (1997). 
3 SeeDunleavy (1980), Jones (1979). 
4 An exception to this view is Davey's (1996, p. 261) assumption that IGR are basically 
concerned with power. 
There are no great conflicts in the concept of intergovernmental relations, as 
opposed to the unfinished (and highly ideological) discussion around the 
concept of local government.5 IGR is the study of relationships between 
different levels of government. This apparently simple definition hides a struggle 
between branches of the social sciences on how to approach IGR studies. Smith 
(1985) summarised the advantages of each approach as follows. First, the 
historical-legal approach focuses on institutional and procedural changes which 
may be made to alter the distribution of power between levels of government. 
Second, the community-politics approach emphasises that changes in IGR may 
be neutralised by their political and economic contexts. Third, inter-
organisational studies call attention to the multidimensional nature of IGR and 
the power resources which can be utilised when governments interact. The 
problem with studies based on these approaches is that they tend to isolate 
conflicts between levels of government from other political conflicts in society. 
Hence, Smith (1985) suggested that a study of IGR should be placed within a 
framework of conflicting interests. 
Calls for the need for a theoretical shift in the approach to IGR have been 
made to overcome what Elazar (1987) saw as an obsolete theoretical orientation, 
namely the view of IGR from the logic of the centre-periphery model. He called 
for a new model able to incorporate discussion of the likely constituent elements 
of the federation and whether they would be primarily administrative vehicles or 
polities. Hence, this paper has developed the interpretation of the relationship 
between the states and the federal government in Brazil in line with the 
propositions of Smith (1985) and Elazar (1987). By doing so this paper argues 
that, as is true of IGR everywhere, a pattern emerges whereby groups with less 
power and resources are pitted against groups struggling to upgrade their 
position.6 However, this game is not dichotomous but rather a continuum. 
Following these theoretical formulations, the understanding of how conflicts are 
channelled becomes more relevant to this paper's development than the 
investigation of administrative or legal arrangements. 
However, although the frameworks of Smith and Elazar are broad enough to 
encompass the three territorial units of governance, the search for theoretical 
formulations able to capture the differences between sub-national units in 
countries experiencing an unprecedented political, financial and constitutional 
strength in their states, such as post-1988 Brazil and Canada since 1982 
(Marshall, 1988), needs to be narrowed. Therefore, the theoretical foundation 
for the states' role in the IGR game comes from the view of IGR as a 
combination of structure and process, which are continually interacting (Anton, 
1989). As Chapman (1993, p. 71) developed the approach, 
...these patterns of interaction become quasi-institutional, legitimated 
by use or sometimes by legislation or executive fiat. The actors are 
5 For a review of the theories of local politics and local government, see Stoker (1988). 
6 Gagnon (1993) pointed out that the idea that federalism pits government against 
government should be reconsidered. However, this paper argues that for IGR the idea is 
valid and it is one of the bases of the distinction between federalism and IGR. 
continuously involved in mutual transfers creating thereby an additional 
set of structures and processes, extra-constitutional and, in many cases, 
extra-parliamentary. These processes are policy-oriented and problem-
centred, arising at specific times from particular issues, yet remaining, 
in one guise of another, to establish another pattern of IGR. 
What follows from the quotation above is that IGR, especially in federations 
such as Brazil and Canada, are conflict-ridden. However the resolution of 
conflicts does not imply that solutions rest on a rational allocation of 
responsibilities, of revenues, or of merely adversarially-based intergovernmental 
relations. As Chapman (1993) put it, conflicts should not be seen as simply a 
national and sub-national conflict but as an entanglement across those systems. 
One aspect of this paper, however, could not be solved by the above-
mentioned theoretical approach to IGR. The literature on IGR tends to use the 
word influence when referring to the mechanisms used by levels of government 
in their IGR. The paper has opted to use the word influence but also the word 
veto when referring to post-1988 Brazil, and to players in the decision-making 
process as veto players. Veto power and veto players are used after Tsebelis's 
(1993) development of the concept which stems from the idea of 'checks and 
balances' in the North-American constitution. A veto player, in Tsebelis's 
words, is an individual or collective actor whose agreement is required for a 
policy decision. The reason for this choice is that the structures and processes of 
IGR are beginning to be rebuilt in Brazil to cope with the relative novelty of the 
weighted role of sub-national governments in the federation. Therefore 
structures and processes are interwoven and entangled, but mechanisms based 
on 'influence' have not yet fully emerged. 
Studies of intergovernmental relations in Brazil have been traditionally 
addressed under the theoretical formulations of political science, political 
sociology and public administration. Those studies have not been limited to the 
analysis of the relationships between governmental units, but have tended to 
incorporate two other approaches: i) the relationship between the state and 
society, a division common in discussions of authoritarianism; and ii) how the 
distribution of territorial power influences political arrangements and pacts. 
Works focused on the political arrangements before 1964 tended towards a 
dichotomous view of the relationship between levels of government and between 
state and society without capturing their interdependence. Some of those studies 
viewed territorial cleavages in Brazil as following a pattern in which the state 
dominated society, and the federal government the sub-national units, as in 
Faoro's (1958) work. Another approach saw society as dominated by private 
interests and the state as the result of compromises between local and regional 
interests, as in the works of Duarte (1939), Freyre (1964), Vianna (1949) and 
Queiroz (1976). A variant of the latter school of thought is represented by Leal's 
(1977) work focusing on the municipality to explain the power of local patrons, 
the coroneis. Leal showed the contradictions behind the adoption of modern 
forms of political representation such as universal suffrage, in a milieu of 
poverty, centralisation of power and resources at the state and federal levels and 
of decadent, private local power. 
During the 1970s works by Balan (1974), Cardoso (1975) and Uricoechea 
(1980) attempted to overcome the dichotomous approach. However, they 
continued to stress the predominance of the state versus society, and of the 
centre versus the periphery. In the 1980s, works by Ames (1987), Medeiros 
(1986) and Schwartzman (1988) incorporated the interdependence of local, 
regional and national politics into their views of the relationships between state 
and society and between levels of government in their political arrangements 
within the federation. However, because these studies were developed before the 
constitutional espousal of decentralisation, they no longer capture the current 
trends in Brazilian politics. 
There have been efforts from international financial organisations to analyse 
the financial aspects of Brazil's decentralisation and the fiscal tensions between 
the federal and state governments. There have been works by economists 
discussing the political economy of inflation and the constraints blocking 
economic growth, in which the role of sub-national governments is briefly 
assessed (Bresser Pereira, 1993; Franco, 1993). However, studies based on an 
understanding of the reasons which caused Brazil to become such a 
decentralised nation, and the effects of decentralisation on the political and 
financial systems and on policy results at the sub-national level are few. 
Although studies on the influence of intergovernmental relations and 
decentralisation in shaping Brazil's current political system are still in their 
infancy, both issues have been on the political agenda since the beginning of the 
1990s.7 
Brazilian Regions and States: Some Features 
Brazil is a country marked by inter- and intra-regional disparities. Despite a 
certain degree of spatial de-concentration which occurred in the mid-1970s, the 
gap between states and regions remains wide. From the geographical viewpoint, 
Brazil is divided into five regions. The State of Sao Paulo, in the south-east, is 
the centre of the Brazilian economy. In 1985 the south-east accounted for 70 per 
cent of the country's industrial production and 58 per cent of its GDP, with 34 
per cent in Sao Paulo alone. In 1991 the south-east, which accounts for 10.8 per 
cent of the country's territory and 42.6 per cent of the population, accounted for 
59 per cent of GDP and 66 per cent of industrial production. The north-east, by 
contrast, where 28.9 per cent of the population live, contributed with 13.6 per 
cent of GDP and 12 per cent of industrial production (Guimaraes, 1995). 
Income per capita in the south-east is almost three times greater than that of 
the north-east. Marked differences may be also found in all other indicators. 
7 Souza's (1997) work is an attempt to link these issues. Kinzo (1996) included 
decentralisation among the factors accountable for the difficulties faced by the current 
decision-making process. 
Work by the IPEA (1993) shows that in 1990 out of 32 million Brazilians whose 
income was only enough for a daily diet, according to the guideline established 
by the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), 54.5 per cent live in the 
north-east, 2.2 per cent in the north; 25.2 per cent in the south-east; 12.9 per cent 
in the south; and 5.2 per cent in the centre-west. Life expectancy in the north-
east was 58.8 years in 1990, whereas the country's average was 64.9. Income 
per capita in the north-east was US$918 in contrast to the country's average of 
US$2,241 (Albuquerque, 1993). 
As regards the states, the participation of the main state economies in 
Brazil's GDP was, in 1990, as follows: Sao Paulo, 35 per cent; Rio de Janeiro, 
11 per cent; Minas Gerais, 9.5 per cent; Rio Grande do Sul, 7.8 per cent; Parana, 
7.7 per cent; and Bahia, 5 per cent. However, GDP per capita shows a different 
distribution among the states. The highest rate was found in Brasilia 
(US$4,988), followed by Sao Paulo, with US$3,993; Rio de Janeiro, with 
US$3,352; Rio Grande do Sul, with US$2,738; Santa Catarina, with US$2,344; 
and Parana, with US$2,037. Minas Gerais is in seventh place, with US$1,850, 
and Bahia in tenth place, with US$1,226 (Albuquerque, 1993). 
Brazilian federalism and the relationship between the federal and the state 
governments are no different from the country's socio-economic features: they 
are marked by enormous differences and complexity. As noted by Afonso and 
Lobo (1996), the federation presents a high participation of the sub-national 
spheres in the national revenue, as well as in expenditure, either in payroll and 
consumption or in investments, without great interference from the central 
government. On the other hand, the country pays a relatively high price to 
maintain national unity and has a complex and inarticulate system of IGR. 
To counterbalance the country's regional inequality, Brazil has, since 1946, 
adopted a fiscal system aiming at a better vertical and horizontal balance 
through the redistribution of the national revenue from the well-off to the worse-
off regions. This scheme was considerably extended by the 1988 Constitution. 
As reported by Afonso and Lobo (1996) the centre-south of the country 
generates around 80 per cent of GDP and of the national revenue, but retains 
only 60 per cent of the expenditure. Because of the system of horizontal balance, 
which transfers resources from better-off states to worse-off ones, the fiscal 
system is highly entangled and whenever the economy of well-off states slows 
down, less developed regions are also affected. On the other hand, of all fiscal 
incentives, 38.3 per cent go to the Amazon region, 9.6 per cent to the north-east 
and 51.6 per cent to the centre-west, south, and south-east regions (Braudel 
Papers, 1993). Moreover, most of the incentives going to the Amazon region 
and the north-east benefit companies from the south-east. 
These socio-economic disparities also have a political pay off: smaller and 
economically weaker states hold proportionally more seats in the Chamber of 
Deputies than bigger constituencies. This over-representation was first 
introduced in 1932 to counterbalance the power of the states of Sao Paulo and 
Minas Gerais in the federation. It has been maintained ever since. Arguments 
against this over-representation emphasise two points. First, it acts against the 
principle of electoral systems based on proportional representation, because the 
goal of one person, one vote is not totally met. It is also criticised because 
parliamentarians from smaller states tend to act according to parochial demands. 
However, there are historical and political facts favouring this over-
representation. First, the scheme was set up as a way to decrease the control of 
Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais over the whole country. The concentration of 
economic and human resources in the south-east, especially in Sao Paulo, has 
since decreased, but the gap among regions remains wide. Second, the over-
representation of smaller units of the federation is one element reinforcing the 
relationship between federalism and consociational democracy, according to 
Lijphart's (1984) formulation. Third, the over-representation of weaker 
economic units of the federation forces the political system, the federal 
government and Congress to incorporate the problems of Brazil's regional 
inequalities into the political agenda. 
The Strength of the States in the Brazilian Federation 
The states in Brazil have always enjoyed great political power, compared to 
their financial strength. This power was considered by Brazil's two authoritarian 
experiences as an obstacle to their objectives: both Vargas and the military 
regime of 1964 tried to diminish the power of the states. Seeking greater 
political and administrative unity, Vargas strengthened the federal government 
by centralising resources and by appointing 'intervenors' to replace popularly 
elected governors.8 The military regime of 1964 again promoted centralisation 
of the national resources and prohibited popular elections in the states and their 
capitals. With democratisation, however, it was no longer possible to restrain the 
power of the governors, especially those who governed economically strong 
states. Furthermore, the influence of the governors upon the state delegation in 
Congress is now often stronger than the political parties to which they belong. 
The power of the governors may express itself in several ways, but the main 
vehicle is the power to veto measures proposed by the federal government, 
which have not previously been negotiated with them. Negotiations with 
regional leaders mainly address solutions to the financial constraints faced by 
the states. Negotiations follow three main paths. First, the governors have an 
important say in the appointment of officials to the federal bureaucracy and to 
the board of federal-owned companies. It has been estimated that the number of 
politically appointed positions in the federal Executive is 63,570, plus the 
directorates of over 100 federal-owned companies. Of all politically appointed 
positions, 73 per cent are for civil servants and 27 per cent are totally free for 
8 Intervenor is the title given to those who are appointed by the federal government 
when a federal intervention in a state is declared. During the Vargas period the 
intervenor had executive and legislative powers in the state's jurisdiction. An example of 
Vargas's uneasiness with the states was that he publicly burned the state flags in an 
official ceremony. 
political negotiation. The president uses these positions to negotiate with 
Congress and with regional leaders and to build coalitions for government.9 
Second, the governors negotiate more resources for their states, despite an 
increase of 3.5 per cent of the national fiscal revenue granted to them by the 
1988 Constitution. These resources are achieved by negotiating larger shares in 
the federal budget, by the concession of incentives, subsidies and loans at 
subsidised interest rates, and federal guarantees in loans with international 
financial organisations. 
Third, and currently the most important aspect of the federal-state relations, 
is the governors' strength used as a way to compel the federal government to re-
negotiate the states' debt. In the 1980s and 1990s the states' debts have been re-
negotiated numerous times. The state creditors are mainly the federal 
government, the commercial banks under the state control, the financial 
institutions controlled by the federal government and the international financial 
institutions. This aspect of the relationship between the states and the federal 
government is one of the most complicated issues and it is also the one which 
has had the greatest effect on the federal balance and on the performance of the 
public accounts. 
The Indebtedness of the States 
The debt of the states was estimated at around R$100 billion in December 1996 
(40 per cent in short-term debt) which implies high interest rates. Four states, the 
most powerful economically, account for 90 per cent of the debt. Three of these 
states, Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais, are governed by the 
president's party, the Party of Brazilian Social Democracy (PSDB), and one, 
Rio Grande do Sul, by the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement 
(PMDB), which belongs to the president's coalition at the national level. 
Furthermore, these states occupy a high number of seats in Congress, since they 
are Brazil's most populous states. Large delegations mean that the victory or 
failure of measures sent to Congress by the Executive depends, to a great extent, 
on these delegations. Only three states, Ceara, Bahia and Parana, the two former 
situated in the north-east and the latter in the south, are said to have their debts 
under control. One feature shared by Ceara and Bahia is the fact that the same 
political group has been controlling the state politics since the mid-1980s. As for 
Parana, this state has been marked by a tradition of technocratic values, which 
has meant less room for the politicisation of the finance of the state, although 
two political parties, the PMDB and the Democratic Labour Party (PDT), have 
occupied the Executive since the return to popular elections. 
9 It has been reported that the federal government's intention to extinguish 22 entities is 
under pressure from the states' delegations in Congress. The states of Minas Gerais and 
Goias, for instance, which have traditionally appointed the directorate of the company 
for roads, the DNER, have already managed to exclude it from the list of those to be 
abolished (Folha de Sao Paulo, 8 August 1996). 
Despite the fact that the 1988 Constitution has promoted a great 
decentralisation of national resources from the federal to the sub-national level, 
solutions have not yet been found to address the problem of the debts inherited 
by them. Pressures coming from the states to transfer to the federal government 
the responsibility for their debts, on the one hand, and the dependence of the 
federal government upon the governors' support - together with the federal 
commitment for fiscal adjustment - have promoted a game in which the only 
result, so far, has been the postponement and the worsening of the states' debt 
problem. 
States and municipalities are presently accountable for 51.5 per cent of the 
public deficit. The public deficit stands at 31.5 per cent of GDP. Of the internal 
federal debt, estimated in June 1996 at R$154 billion, the main item, amounting 
to R$34 billion, corresponds to the payment of interest, following a policy 
adopted since the issue of the Real Plan, designed to restrain consumption and to 
maintain the stabilisation plan. The second largest item of the internal federal 
debt, amounting to R$29 billion, corresponds to the federal help given to the 
states and to the commercial banks under their control. 
The relationship between the states and their commercial banks works as 
follows. As a result of the 1966 fiscal reform, which promoted a centralisation of 
revenues, the state commercial banks were granted permission to make loans to 
their main shareholders, that is, the states. Since then the states have been using 
their commercial banks as one of their main sources of income. The states did 
not usually pay their debts with their commercial banks and, furthermore, they 
would request resources the banks did not have, which in turn forced the Central 
Bank to cover the deficit, throwing more currency into the market, thereby 
pushing up inflation. The states currently owe their commercial banks over R$23 
billion, R$18 billion of which corresponds to the state of Sao Paulo. It has been 
reported that the federal government is about to issue a model for the 
privatisation of the state commercial banks and that six states (Rio de Janeiro, 
Sao Paulo, Minas Gerais, Mato Grosso, Alagoas and Rondonia) have already 
reached an agreement to privatise their banks; twelve others are still negotiating 
the terms of the adjustment of their commercial banks, although not all of them 
are likely to have their banks privatised (Folha de Sao Paulo, 17 January 
1997).10 
Since the Collor administration, several attempts to control the debts of the 
states have been made without success. The latest attempt began in August 1996, 
allowing the federal government to back the financial adjustment of the state 
commercial banks, aiming at their privatisation. Resources from privatisation 
would be earmarked for the payment of the state's debt with the federal 
government. Furthermore, revenues accruing from the states' share in the federal 
revenue would be taken as a guarantee for payment. The latter scheme has been 
10 The State of Rio de Janeiro has followed a unique direction for the adjustment of its 
commercial bank. After its intervention by the Central Bank, the state agreed to transfer 
it to a private bank. The bank is now ready to have its 'healthy' part privatised. 
unsuccessfully tried in the past. It is estimated that the federal help to the states 
and their banks will cost the taxpayers R$12 billion. 
Paradoxically, Brazilian states are highly capitalised when compared to other 
federal countries, especially those in the developing world. Furthermore, Brazil 
is unique in the fact that it has a value-added tax under the jurisdiction of the 
states. This tax, the Value-added, Communications and Transportation Tax 
(ICMS), is the highest tax levied in the country, registering increases in amounts 
levied higher than inflation rates.11 
In justifying their web of unpaid debts the governors blame the high interest 
rates, which became, according to one of them, Antonio Britto, from Rio Grande 
do Sul, an unpayable atomic bomb (Folha de Sao Paulo, 18 December 1996). 
However, when the policy of high interest rates was not in place, the disarray in 
the states' finances was much the same as it is today, as shown by Souza (1996). 
This has meant that the indebtedness of the states is more a result of the federal 
government's need to build governing coalitions, preventing it from adopting 
tighter control over the states' debts, together with the federal policy of high 
interest rates. This is not a new problem. The military opened up the gates of the 
state commercial banks to the states as a way of counterbalancing the 
centralisation of revenues. Even before the military regime, Ames (1987) 
showed that when the presidential administrations of Vargas and Kubitschek 
increased spending under the aegis of the 1946 Constitution, powerful state-level 
politicians dominated Congress's Budget Committee and took control of the 
resources. 
Therefore, the indebtedness of the states is more a result of debts from the 
past, now aggravated by the policy of high interest rates. This confirms one of 
the current concepts of ungovernabilty as defined by Fiori (1995), that is, the 
incapacity of the governments to regain their power of initiative because of their 
financial constraints, principally their inherited debt. Addressing solutions to the 
state debt clashes with the political strength of the governors, forcing the federal 
government to postpone the adoption of more definitive solutions, given that the 
governors are now one of the main partners in the governing coalitions at the 
national level. 
The indebtedness of the states has been further troubled by the decrease in 
inflation due to the fact that the governors over the last decades have invested 
their revenues in the financial market. Therefore, before the Real Plan, the 
combination of inflation and high interest rates played a short-term positive role 
in the states' revenue, since they were able to invest their revenue and were freer 
to adopt a policy of wage compression than the federal government, because 
their civil services were not as strong as those at the federal level. 
11 In 1995, the sub-national governments directly levied 34 per cent of the country's 
revenues, including taxes and contributions, and they retained 44 per cent of all revenue 
because of their participation in two federal taxes (Afonso and Lobo, 1996). 
The indebtedness of two contrasting states, Sao Paulo and Alagoas, requires 
a more detailed comment, because of its implications for the federal system and 
for the political system itself. Both states are under the threat of undergoing 
federal intervention requested by their Judiciary. The State of Sao Paulo owed 
around R$60 billion in December 1996, including judicial awards worth around 
R$5.5 billion - hence the reason for a federal intervention. Alagoas is not 
fulfilling its constitutional obligation to transfer resources for the functioning of 
the state's courts, which also gives grounds for a federal intervention. Because 
Alagoas lacks the resources to cover its payroll, the police, judges, teachers and 
health workers of the state have stopped working for several months during the 
last year, causing all public functions to come to a standstill. An important 
aspect in analysing the size of the debt is the relationship between the debt and 
the state's net revenue. This relationship tends to be closer in smaller states, 
which makes the solution to the problem harder to achieve. Another relationship 
has to be made between the debt and the GDP. In 1993, Sao Paulo's debt 
accounted for nine per cent of the state's GDP, which was relatively low when 
compared to other Brazilian states and even to other Latin American countries.12 
If the debt of Sao Paulo is not high when compared to its net revenue or to its 
GDP, the federal help to well-off states promotes more imbalance to the federal 
system by making the country's taxpayers, including those of less developed 
regions, pay for the debt of well developed states. As for small states, the 
problem lies not in the debt itself, but in the state's commitment to payroll 
expenditure. This is also the case of Brasilia. As a result, even if the federal 
government finds a solution for the state's current financial constraints, they will 
still have to borrow to pay their payroll. 
Another aspect of the cases of Sao Paulo and Alagoas is the fact that 
situations which give grounds for federal intervention may increase the 
bargaining power of regional leaders. The reason for this is that the 1988 
Constitution determines that no constitutional amendment can be passed if a 
state is under federal intervention. Because the federal government has as its 
main priority to change the constitution, the debts of the states are no longer 
only a fiscal problem, but rather a political one. The tension increases because 
the main reform on the agenda is currently the re-election of the heads of the 
Executive at the three levels of government. Re-election, however, might not be 
as attractive to the governors as it is to the incumbent president, because the 
governors probably have less chance of re-election given the financial situation 
of the states they govern. 
While a more definitive solution for the state debt has not been found, the 
states have found ways to obtain some extra revenue. This was the case of an 
event which became a scandal, damaging the image of some governors and 
mayors. The states were improperly using one of the few opportunities left open 
by the 1988 Constitution allowing the states to issue bonds to pay for debts 
12 In 1993 Argentina's debt was 26.6 per cent of GDP, although it was 112 per cent 
before the introduction of the policy of tight fiscal control (Gazeta Mercantile 9 October 
1993). 
contracted before 1988. The bonds could only be issued when the courts 
recognised the debt as pertinent. After the courts' decisions, the states had to ask 
for the Central Bank and the Senate's authorisation to issue the bonds. Because 
between 1988 and 1994 the country had high inflation, the governors had 
overestimated the amount to be paid and apparently used the resources for other 
purposes. All the cases which went for Senate approval were passed, despite 
negative recommendation by the Central Bank. Between 1995 and 1996 the 
Senate approved the issue of bonds amounting to R$2.2 billion to the states of 
Alagoas, Pernambuco, Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina and to seven 
municipalities, six in Sao Paulo, including its capital. The Senate has constituted 
a Parliamentary Inquiry Commission to investigate these cases, given that there 
are suspicions of two types. First, the states were using the resources for 
purposes other than the payment of judicial awards, in particular to pay their 
bills with the building industry, a powerful lobby in Brazil. Second, the bonds 
were issued in the market by private financial institutions, with high profits, such 
as the one in Santa Catarina, which is estimated to have earned R$25 million. 
The indebtedness of the states is so high that most of the governors are 
barely able to cover their payroll and have very few or no resources left for 
investment or for improving social services. Therefore, the constitutional 
amendment allowing re-election is not a good business for them, at least in the 
short term. Nevertheless, they have been using the government's intention to 
pass the re-election amendment for more negotiations, especially in relation to 
their debt problem. 
Despite the lack of resources available for investment, a calculation by 
Afonso (1994) demonstrated that, slowly, the states are replacing the federal 
government in some spheres, while others remain without governmental support, 
the federal government having backed down. This unplanned and uncoordinated 
transfer of responsibilities contradicts the view that the financial constraints 
faced by the federal government are due solely to the lack of responsibility 
transfer to the sub-national levels. This transfer of responsibilities, however, has 
not significantly changed policy results at the state level and is subject to 
distortions. These distortions are more likely to be explained by the fact that the 
decision to decentralise was taken without a social consensus on what was to be 
achieved, as discussed in Souza (1997). Furthermore, IGR have become highly 
politicised since the rules of the fiscal system, including the distribution of 
revenues between levels of government, are now a detailed chapter of the 1988 
Constitution or they are subject to the rule of laws and/or pacts made between 
the heads of the Executive and Congress. The problems faced by the federal 
government lay more in the power gained by sub-national leaders and Congress, 
which tend to have a regional and local view of national issues, and in the lack 
of a social consensus on what has to be achieved through decentralisation, 
together with the impossibility of finding a definitive solution to deal with the 
debts of the states. 
The Federal Government's Willingness to Negotiate 
The federal government has shown a willingness to negotiate, yet again, the 
states' debts. It is also accepting the 'federalisation' of part of the states' debts, 
meaning that their debts with the private banks are transferred to the federal 
government, although the states should pay them off at subsidised interest rates 
(six per cent per year) over between 15 and 30 years. If all the 27 states join the 
programme, the federal government might become accountable for a debt of 
around R$72 billion. In exchange, the states are expected to privatise state-
owned companies, especially those of telecommunications and electricity, and 
undergo a fiscal adjustment, in particular a reduction in payroll expenditure. 
Negotiations are made on a case by case basis and the agreement can only be 
signed after its approval by the Senate and the state's legislature to protect the 
federal government against future judicial challenges and changes in the political 
groups governing the states. As shown in Table 1, ten agreements have been 
made and four, those of Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul and 
Minas Gerais, are of fiscal importance. 
Table 1 - Conditions of the Re-negotiations of the States' Debts 
Sao Paulo 29,307 30 years June 2008 To be defined 
Rio de Janeiro 11,600 30 years Under negotiation State commercial 
bank 
Minas Gerais 9,235 30 years Dec 2006 To be defined 
Rio Grande do Sul 6,651 30 years Dec 2008 To be defined 
Maranhao 75 30 years Dec 2016 Electricity 
Pernambuco 862 15 years Not mentioned Telecommunications, 
Synthetic Rubber 
Piauf 139 15 years Dec 2003 Electricity 
Sergipe 301 30 years Dec 2004 Electricity 
Mato Grosso do Sul 375 30 years Dec 2012 Electricity 
Par* 224 15 years Already achieved Electricity 
Source: Folha de Sao Paulo (22 December 1996). 
As a short-term measure the government allowed the Caixa Economica 
Federal, a federal bank, to lend resources to the states preventing them from 
paying the high interest rates charged by private institutions. Until August 1996, 
this bank, which is also facing financial problems, made loans to states and 
municipalities amounting to R$6 billion. A loan from the federal government 
and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) of around R$1 billion is about 
to be authorised by Congress aiming at the financial adjustment of those states 
that have already gained the Senate's approval to renegotiate their debts under 
State Debt re-negotiated Validity ot Deadline for the net Companies to be 
K$ million re-negotiation revenue to equal privatised 
(estimated) expenditure 
the rules of the package issued in August 1996. The loan aims at the 
rationalisation of the states' fiscal machinery. 
The federal government has always reacted to the states' pressures in an 
ambiguous way. The presidents have tried to promote the idea that the states are 
responsible for public sector problems, including the public deficit. On the other 
hand, and because of the increase in the power of the Legislature granted by the 
Constitution, the presidents need the state governors' support to obtain 
congressional approval for their policies, because of the influence the governors 
exert over their state's delegation in Congress. Given that the presidents always 
had difficulties guaranteeing a strong and stable parliamentary base, they need to 
maintain good relations with the governors who can influence the state 
representation in Congress. In a milieu of political party fragmentation and 
fragility and of an electoral system of open-list proportional representation, the 
governors as a group have become one of the main players in assuring the 
federal government in its capacity to govern. This picture shows that the federal 
government alone is not in a position to overcome the fiscal constraints of 
Brazil's public finance. 
The Ongoing Constitutional Reforms 
Since the promulgation of the 1988 Constitution, its reform is on the agenda of 
the business community and investors, both national and international. They 
regard the revision of the Constitution as the only way to 'modernise' the 
country and to free it from the constraints blocking its development. Indeed, the 
1988 Constitution was born under the aegis of its revision given that one of its 
articles determined that it should be reviewed in 1993.13 Another point 
demonstrating this is the low number of votes required for a constitutional 
amendment: three-fifths of the members of Congress, one of the lowest in the 
world. However, those who advocated a total revision of the Constitution in 
1993 were defeated. The causes of their defeat are manifold, one of them being 
Brazil's congested electoral agenda: every two years parliamentarians are 
involved in electoral races either for national, state or local elections. 
From the viewpoint of the presidency, two presidents, Fernando Collor and 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, became particularly committed to changing the 
Constitution. Both argued in favour of its amendment on the grounds that the 
state must be reformed to guarantee what they call the country's governability. 
Collor's proposals were first blocked by his authoritarian behaviour, which led 
to an unwillingness to negotiate with Congress and with regional leaders and 
later to his impeachment. Cardoso is still struggling with Congress, a 
controversial amendment allowing re-election for executive positions having 
13 This article was approved by the majority of leftist and centrist parties, showing their 
confidence in increasing social and democratic measures adopted by the Constitution. 
Only the PFL, a right-wing party, voted against the article, although today it is this party 
which exerts the most pressure to change the Constitution. 
been added to the list of the constitutional reforms. 
Since its promulgation, the Constitution has undergone 20 amendments, a 
relatively low number considering the high number of proposals by the 
Executive and parliamentarians. The most important measures were related to 
the divestiture of state monopolies. Two amendments affected the fiscal system. 
One reintroduced the Temporary Contribution on Financial Transactions 
(CPMF), with its resources to be earmarked for health care programmes. The 
second amendment created a federal fund, the FSE, Fundo Social de Emergencia 
(Emergency Social Fund), renamed later the Fiscal Stabilisation Fund (FEF). 
The fund's purpose is to ensure that the government's fiscal position is kept 
under control through the retention of 20 per cent of all federal taxes, except 
transfers to sub-national spheres. 
Three major amendments sponsored by the Federal Executive were sent to 
Congress in 1995 and are still under debate. These amendments are related to 
the federal system and to the so-called reform of the state. The reforms are to 
change the fiscal system, the social security system and the rights of civil 
servants. How far the governors are backing the contents of these reforms is not 
yet clear, except the proposition to abolish the right of life tenure granted by the 
1988 Constitution to civil servants. Paradoxically, most of the support in favour 
of the latter comes from governors who belong to the Partido dos Trabalhadores 
(PT). 
The government's proposals have been subjected to several changes in 
Congress. The federal government is showing its intention to negotiate and 
compromise but there are certain aspects of the reforms which are unlikely to be 
negotiable. In the reform of civil servants' rights, it seems that the government 
will struggle to eliminate their life tenure, to set a ceiling on their wages and to 
prohibit the payment by the Treasury of more than one wage in addition to their 
pension. As for the social security system, the line of resistance seems to lie in 
the age limit for retirement combined with the increase in the number of years to 
qualify for retirement. These measures are intended to reduce the rights of civil 
servants, who enjoy a special and more privileged retirement scheme than 
workers from other sectors. In the fiscal reform the goal is to rationalise the 
fiscal system and to reduce the cost of production. 
The federal government, which was putting pressure on Congress to approve 
these three reforms, has changed its strategy because of i) its recent history of 
defeats in Congress committees; ii) the high cost of negotiations; and iii) the fact 
that it has shifted focus to the amendment allowing the re-election. Under 
pressures from the Party of the Liberal Front (PFL), investors and international 
financing organisations, who regard the time and the costs of the reforms in 
Congress as too slow and expensive, the federal government has opted to adopt 
measures which do not require constitutional amendments. These measures 
include the following. First, the government has frozen its expenditure on 
payroll and no monetary updating has been carried out on civil servants' wages 
since January 1995. Furthermore, increases in pensions paid by the social 
security system have been below inflation. Second, the government is putting 
pressure on the states and municipalities to privatise and to reduce their payroll 
expenditure. Third, it has been passing provisional measures of dubious juridical 
value reducing the rights of civil servants. Fourth, certain measures have been 
taken through ordinary or complementary legislation, which require the support 
of fewer parliamentarians than a constitutional amendment. Examples of such 
measures include: i) a programme stimulating voluntary redundancy of civil 
servants from the state and the federal governments (although the results at the 
federal level were disappointing: only 11,000 civil servants requested 
redundancy, one-third of the target set by the government); ii) pressure on the 
states to privatise their companies and to decrease their expenditure in exchange 
for the re-negotiation of their debts. However, the most important measure, 
praised by the business community, was the exemption of several export 
products from the ICMS, a state tax. States financially penalised by this measure 
are to be compensated by the federal government. The states were persuaded to 
accept the reduction of their main tax for the following reasons. First, because 
there was no law regulating the levy of the ICMS, the fiscal life of the states was 
constantly disturbed by judicial decisions against the states. Second, the states 
were convinced that a reduction in the tax would increase production, thus 
bringing more revenue than that accruing from the previous system. 
To sum up, the increase in states' finances gained after the 1988 Constitution 
have had little effect upon the states themselves because of the expansion of 
their payroll expenditure and the size of their inherited debt, exacerbated by the 
policy of high interest rates and inflation control. Despite their financial 
constraints, the states have increased their influence over the federal 
government, as well as their veto power, through their political strength and their 
share in the public deficit. The strength of sub-national governments does not 
mean, however, that Brazil has returned to the ways of the Old Republic, in 
which the regional interests of a few states prevailed. Between the Old Republic 
and post-1988 Brazil, the country has become an urban society and an industrial 
economy, together with improvements in the political and electoral systems, 
which became more democratic and competitive. 
The power-sharing relationship set up since 1988 does not imply that every 
state or every municipality enjoys the same amount of power; instead, there are 
several unequal but competing power centres which have a voice in deciding on 
or in vetoing national policies. The existence of several power centres does not 
mean that the strategies used by the states in the intergovernmental relations are 
the same. However, the states have created several quasi-institutional, extra-
constitutional and extra-parliamentary structures and processes in their 
intergovernmental relations. These structures and processes have assumed 
various forms. In their relationship with the federal government, structures and 
processes are developed by the states in the following ways: i) by the influence 
governors exert over the states' delegation in Congress; and ii) by appointment 
to positions in the federal government's governing coalition. To differing 
degrees the states have increased their bargaining power upon the federal 
government, strengthening, therefore, the federation. 
Conclusions 
This paper has investigated the results of decentralisation in a federal country 
characterised by regional inequalities. It has also shown the strategies used by 
the federal and the state governments to cope with their financial constraints, as 
well as the mutual dependence between these spheres of government. The 
evidence shows that, despite the fact that decentralisation strengthens the 
prospects of democratic consolidation by the incorporation of several power 
centres in the political game, there are political and economic factors which 
influence the outcomes of decentralisation. One of these factors is the limits of 
financial decentralisation in countries where regional and social inequalities are 
very deep. This point brings an aspect to the discussion of decentralisation 
generally ignored by the literature, that is to say, that decentralisation and 
intergovernmental relations do not occur in a political and economic vacuum, 
but are rather a result of a pre-existing context. 
On the other hand, decentralisation forces the political system to address 
solutions to Brazil's regional cleavages. Despite the fact that Brazilian 
federalism has experienced varying features throughout the country's republican 
history, it has remained a mechanism of political negotiation able to buffer 
regional inequalities. After 1988 several competing power centres have had 
access to the national decision-making process. In a democratic system in which 
the political parties are weak, regional leaders have become a major source of 
support for the federal government. 
The governors' strength does not mean that the federal government is an 
absent player. The use of federal political appointments, the success in passing 
bills to overcome temporarily its cash-flow problems, the changes already made 
in sensitive aspects of the Constitution and the approval of several stabilisation 
plans prove this argument. At the same time, the governors' strength has created 
patterns of additional intergovernmental relations, in which extra-constitutional 
and extra-parliamentary structures and processes are as important as ordinary 
ones. The existence of these structures and processes suggest that 
intergovernmental conflicts are entanglements across national and sub-national 
systems, as mentioned above. The impact of constitutional reform upon state-
federal relations should be viewed within this framework, that is to say that 
constitutional reform per se is not likely to promote substantial change on the 
above mentioned pattern of intergovernmental relations. 
Brazil's experience confirms the vision that federalism as a mechanism of 
territorial power-sharing is a way to accommodate conflicts rather than to 
promote harmony. It also confirms the view that IGR are more likely to be based 
on conflicting interests which are in turn an expression of other political 
conflicts in society. From this viewpoint one should consider conflicts as 
inherent to federal systems and to intergovernmental relations, particularly in 
countries like Brazil, which have opted to make the political 'opening' before 
fiscal, economic and administrative reforms. In this sense Brazil's experience is, 
to this day, unique. By opting for this path the federation is strengthened by the 
incorporation of regional demands on a congested political agenda, although this 
path may delay a more definitive solution to Brazil's fiscal and administrative 
problems. 
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